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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure 2.0 4.5 3.3 2.6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4.8 1.8 5.3 3.5 3.6 
Investment 18.1 27.9 61.2 15.6 12.0 
Exports 14.4 38.4 4.6 4.5 4.9 
Imports 14.9 26.0 16.4 6.2 7.7 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 8.3 25.6 5.1 5.0 4.0 
Gross National Product (GNP) 9.0 16.4 9.6 5.4 3.9 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %)      
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.1 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 
      
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 1,914 1,964 2,020 2,087 2,134 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 243 204 172 136 121 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.3 9.4 7.9 6.1 5.4 
      
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€bn) -7.2 -5.0 -1.8 -1.7 -0.6 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -3.7 -1.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 
General Government Debt, % of GDP 105.2 78.7 75.4 66.2 62.4 
      
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 3.2 26.2 7.6 -5.8 -14.3 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.9 12.7 3.3 -2.3 -5.4 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2016 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 92.7 96.6 4.2 1.0 3.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.0 28.4 5.2 -0.1 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 53.2 87.7 64.9 2.3 61.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 326.6 335.0 2.6 -1.9 4.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.4 
   
Final Demand 501.8 550.1 9.6 -0.7 10.4 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  239.9 274.4 14.4  -1.7 16.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 262.0 275.6 5.2 0.2 5.0 
Net Factor Payments  -56.0 -48.8 
   
GNP at Market Prices 206.0 226.7 10.1 0.4 9.6 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.2 0.1 1.7 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 76.1 80.3 4.1 5.4 
Other 102.3 107.4 5.1 5.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 0.1 
  
Net Domestic Product 181.9 191.4 9.5 5.2 
Net Factor Payments -56.0 -48.8 7.2 -12.9 
National Income 125.8 142.6 16.7 13.3 
Depreciation 61.6 64.5 2.9 4.7 
GNP at Factor Cost 187.4 207.0 19.6 10.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.6 19.7 1.1 6.1 
GNP at Market Prices 206.0 226.7 20.8 10.1 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 81.2 56.7 -24.5 
F -51.9 -46.4 5.5 
Net Transfers -3.1 -2.7 0.4   
Balance on Current Account 26.2 7.6 -18.6 
as % of GNP 12.7 3.3 -8.2 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2017 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.6 100.1 3.6 1.0 2.6 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.4 28.8 1.6 -1.8 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.7 104.3 18.9 2.9 15.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 335.0 368.7 10.0 5.3 4.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.4 2.0 
   
Final Demand 550.1 603.9 9.8 4.0 5.6 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  274.4 301.8 10.0 3.6 6.2 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 275.7 302.0 9.6 4.4 5.0 
Net Factor Payments  -48.8 -52.0    
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 250.0 10.3 4.6 5.4 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 80.3 85.5 5.2 6.5 
Other 107.4 122.9 15.5 14.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Net Domestic Product 191.4 212.7 20.8 10.9 
Net Factor Payments -48.8 -52.0 -3.1 6.4 
National Income 142.6 160.2 17.6 12.7 
Depreciation 64.5 69.3 4.8 7.5 
GNP at Factor Cost 207.0 229.5 22.5 10.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.7 20.5 0.8 4.0 
GNP at Market Prices 226.7 250.0 23.3 10.3 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 56.6 47.9 8.8 
F -46.4 -51.0 -4.5 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.7 0.0   
Balance on Current Account 7.6 -5.8 -13.4 
as % of GNP 3.3 -2.3 -5.3 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 100.1 103.9 3.8 1.0 2.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.8 30.1 4.4 0.7 3.6 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 104.3 120.9 15.9 3.5 12.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 368.7 398.3 8.0 3.0 4.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 603.9 656.2 8.7 2.7 5.9 
less: 
      
Imports of Goods and Services  301.8 336.0 11.3 3.4 7.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 302.0 320.1 6.0 1.9 4.0 
Net Factor Payments  -52.0 -54.2    
GNP at Market Prices 250.0 265.9 6.3 2.4 3.9 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.3 3.4 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 85.5 90.2 4.7 5.5 
Other 122.9 133.4 10.5 8.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.4 0.4   
Statistical Discrepancy 0.1 0.0 -0.1  
Net Domestic Product 212.2 227.3 15.1 7.1 
Net Factor Payments -52.0 -54.2 -2.3 4.3 
National Income 160.2 173.1 12.9 8.0 
Depreciation 69.3 71.7 2.4 3.5 
GNP at Factor Cost 229.5 244.8 15.3 6.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.5 21.1 0.6 2.8 
GNP at Market Prices 250.0 265.9 15.9 6.3 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 47.9 41.7 -6.2 
F -51.0 -53.2 -2.3 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.7 0.0   
Balance on Current Account -5.8 -14.3 -8.5 
as % of GNP -2.3 -5.4 -3.2 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
While data for the first quarter of the year suggested a certain slowing in the rate 
of economic activity, more recent indicators suggests that 2017 looks set to 
register strong growth for the Irish economy. In particular taxation receipts have 
increased somewhat in Quarter 2 compared with Quarter 1. Based on this and 
the continued strong performance of the Irish labour market and related growth 
in personal consumption we are now increasing our forecast for 2017 to 5.0 per 
cent for GDP. This is up by over 1 per cent from the last Commentary; our GDP 
forecast for 2018 is marginally increased to 4.0 per cent. 
 
The strengthening of the growth rate comes just as the budgetary process is 
being finalised. Given the pace of growth over the past number of years, there is 
certainly no case for the Government to stimulate economic activity with the 
budgetary package. Indeed some commentators have even suggested that the 
budgetary policy should be contractionary to prevent the economy from 
overheating. 
 
At present, given the issues experienced with the National Accounts, it is quite 
difficult to get a definitive assessment of where the Irish economy stands vis-à-vis 
its potential level – a key indicator in fiscal policy. Nonetheless, our assessment is 
that while the economy is certainly converging quite sharply on its sustainable 
level of activity, a number of indicators, particularly with respect to the labour 
market, would suggest that there is still some capacity remaining. Therefore, 
overall, we think the most prudent course of action to take is to adopt a neutral 
fiscal policy, which neither stimulates nor contracts economic activity. 
 
We examine recent Government expenditure in the Commentary noting that any 
significant movements in total expenditure are mostly explained by variations in 
capital as opposed to current expenditure. Given the social-infrastructure deficits 
in housing, healthcare and water provision, one can argue that where public 
expenditure is increased, the focus should be more on capital investment as 
opposed to increases in day-to-day expenditure. 
 
In light of the Government’s intention to increase capital spending to €7.8 billion 
by 2021, Garcia-Rodriguez, using COSMO, examines the implications for the 
domestic economy of such a significant increase in public investment. The overall 
conclusions are that this increase will expand economic output and also cause a 
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deterioration in the public finances. In particular, such a capital plan will have to 
be carefully implemented in order to comply with the fiscal rules. 
 
In another Box in this Commentary Morgenroth draws out some important policy 
conclusions concerning the last period of significant public investment in 
infrastructure. In particular, Morgenroth notes that it is not how much is spent by 
the Government which is important but how effectively spending results in net 
gains for the domestic economy. Also, any public capital plan must support the 
forthcoming National Planning Framework (NPF). 
 
The issue of whether the change in 2014 which increased the qualifying age for 
the Irish contributory state pension had a causal effect on the overall retirement 
rate is explored in a special article to the Commentary. Redmond, McGuinness 
and Kelly compare the retirement rates of two groups of 65-year-olds in 2014; 
one group was born just after the cut-off date, thereby making them ineligible for 
the state pension at age 65, while the other group was born just before the cut-
off date, making them potentially eligible, subject to meeting the insurance 
contribution requirements. Overall, no clear evidence of a causal effect on 
employment or unemployment rates is found. In the context of future possible 
constraints in the labour market, it is particularly interesting to see how 
responsive the Irish labour market might be to measures aimed at increasing 
labour force participation. 
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The International Economy 
 
The overall outlook for the global economy remains positive through the second 
quarter of the year; this reflects an improvement in both advanced and emerging 
market economies. According to consensus forecasts, initial estimates of growth 
indicated that GDP increased at an annual rate of 3.1 per cent in Quarter 2 
reflecting the fastest pace of global growth in two years. 
 
Despite ongoing concerns as to the sustainability of its underlying economic 
performance, the Chinese economy registered strong year-on-year growth of 6.9 
per cent. This should enable authorities to reach the official growth target of 6.5 
per cent for the year. It can be argued that additional reform is required, 
however, to address economic imbalances which persist in the Chinese economy. 
More generally, other developing countries are benefitting from improving global 
demand and greater stability in financial markets. One nascent concern is the 
growing uncertainty concerning key commodity prices; this has the potential to 
reverse some of the economic gains enjoyed by these countries. 
 
Amongst developed economies, the performance of the Euro Area is relatively 
impressive with declining unemployment rates and improving domestic demand 
all contributing to an improved outlook. Even in light of these promising 
developments, the European Central Bank (ECB) has recently announced no plans 
to unwind the quantitative easing programme currently in place until December 
2017, attributing the decision to a weak underlying inflation rate of 1.5 per cent.  
 
While key US economic indicators such as employment growth, consumer 
sentiment and housing market activity point to robust economic growth, political 
uncertainty is especially acute. The Trump administration failed to pass 
healthcare reform to replace ‘Obamacare’ while persistent concerns about links 
between the administration and Russia have all contributed to US political 
instability. Elsewhere the decision by the Bank of Japan to push back its timeline 
to reach 2 per cent inflation suggests that Japanese monetary policy will continue 
to be accommodative for the short to medium term. 
 
THE UK, US AND EURO AREA ECONOMIES 
Figure 1 shows the forecasts for GDP growth by some of the major institutions in 
the respective economies. The outlook overall continues to remain positive over 
the next two years. The wide bands around the UK forecast for 2017 and 2018 
indicate that uncertainty regarding the outcome of Brexit on the UK economy is 
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still pronounced with GDP forecasts for 2018 ranging from 0.4 per cent to as high 
as 2.5 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 1 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
        Euro Area           United States           United Kingdom 
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The performance of the UK economy is looking more uncertain as the year 
progresses; both investor and consumer sentiment has weakened during the 
summer months and while the unemployment rate continues to fall, the pick-up 
in inflation, observed since mid-2016, is impacting adversely on real household 
income. Real wage growth, for example, continues to be negative. Much of the 
increase in output in the latter part of 2016 was attributable to greater consumer 
expenditure funded by increased borrowing and a noted reduction in personal 
savings. 
 
Quarterly growth in UK GDP per head would suggest that increases in the first 
half of 2017 (2017 H1) have been virtually non-existent. 
 
Some commentators, such as Wren-Lewis (2017),1 argue that this is evidence of 
Brexit-related effects negatively impacting the UK economy; the Sterling 
depreciation immediately after the vote has led to a fall in real incomes, meaning 
less consumption. There has not been any compensating increase in exports 
because UK firms are not going to expand in markets that might soon disappear 
because of leaving the Single Market or Customs Union. Therefore, it can be 
argued the Brexit depreciation has brought forward some of the negative impacts 
of Brexit on living standards. 
 
                                                          
 
1  https://mainlymacro.blogspot.ie/2017/07/the-uk-slowdown-is-result-of-brexit-and.html. 
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FIGURE 2 REAL UK GDP PER CAPITAL GROWTH (% CHANGE, QUARTER-ON-QUARTER) 
 
 
Source:  Office of National Statistics (ONS). 
 
Overall, the performance of the UK economy is expected to weaken in 2017, as 
higher inflation and uncertainty due to Brexit negotiations are set to adversely 
impact consumers’ expenditure. The accommodative stance taken by the Bank of 
England (BoE) and otherwise healthy global demand is expected to moderate the 
slowdown. FocusEconomics are forecasting 1.6 per cent growth for this year with 
growth in 2018 forecast to fall to 1.3 per cent. 
 
The US labour market displayed strong returns in Quarter 2 with growing 
evidence of shortages of skilled workers in different sectors of the economy. 
While wage growth was weak in Quarter 2, the overall effect of strong 
employment growth, weakening inflation and increased housing market activity 
are all likely to contribute to growing consumer expenditure. However, against 
the underlying improvements in the US economy, the Government appears to be 
deadlocked in its capacity to affect economic performance. The collapse of the 
healthcare reform bill in early July means that the Republican leadership faces 
significant difficulties in getting the 2018 budget through the House. This has 
consequent implications for the ability of the US administration to implement its 
tax reform agenda. 
 
Overall the expectation is that the US economy will grow to a significant degree in 
2017 mainly due to improving business and consumer sentiment and a pick-up in 
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non-residential investment. Consensus Forecast, therefore, is forecasting growth 
of 2.2 per cent this year with growth expected to pick up in 2018 to 2.3 per cent.  
 
The agenda for the recent gathering of Central Bank Governors and other 
policymakers at the Jackson Hole conference in August reflected some of the 
potential policy difficulties impacting the global economy. Rather than the usual 
commentary on monetary policy, the group focussed more on financial and trade 
difficulties; with Chairwoman Yellen of the Fed and President Draghi of the 
European Central Bank, in particular, giving speeches on the dangers of financial 
deregulation and protectionism respectively. 
 
Evidence of Euro Area recovery continued through 2017 with output growing in a 
marked manner in Quarter 2. Economic sentiment in the Euro Area increased to a 
near-decade high in June and the composite PMI points to the best quarterly 
performance in over six years. Harder economic data also reveal an improved 
performance with industrial production registering relatively strong increases and 
unemployment falling to its lowest rate since Quarter 1, 2009. The overall 
improvement in the fortunes of the Euro Area is reflected in the continued 
appreciation in the Euro particularly with respect to Sterling. The Euro-Sterling 
and Euro-Dollar exchange rate since 2000 are plotted in Figure 3. The increase in 
the Euro-Sterling exchange has significant implications for Irish exporters. 
 
FIGURE 3 EURO-DOLLAR AND EURO-POUND EXCHANGE RATE (€1) 
 
 
Source:  European Commission NewCronos. 
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Full negotiations concerning the United Kingdom’s leaving of the European Union 
formally commenced in July. A series of position papers have been released by 
the United Kingdom Government, however the general content appears to be 
quite aspirational in nature. The chief negotiator on behalf of the EU, Michel 
Barnier has clearly stated,2 that before any future trade relationships between 
the UK and the EU are discussed, there first must be agreement on three issues: 
1. The financial cost to the UK of leaving the EU; 
2. Clarification of the rights of EU citizens living in the UK; and 
3. Agreement on the nature of the border between the Republic of Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. 
 
Shifting from our Western outlook however, it is also worth noting the recent 
performance of China. The Chinese economy witnessed significant growth in 
Quarter 1 of the year with particularly strong property sales and export activity. 
Data for Quarter 2 suggest that some of this momentum is moderating with 
weather-related disruptions and lower property sales. The strong performance of 
the Chinese economy combined with the weaker US Dollar lead to an easing of 
capital controls by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) thereby reducing the fall in 
international reserves. The greater success by the Chinese authorities in curtailing 
capital flight resulted in the Yuan strengthening over the summer period. In 
response to the strong growth performance the government tightened fiscal 
expenditure in Quarter 2. Additionally, recent releases from the PBOC illustrate 
that lending rates in the Chinese economy are gradually increasing in response to 
the PBOC’s attempts to promote financial deleveraging within the economy. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS 
In Figure 4 the annual growth rate of total Irish exports and imports over the 
period Quarter 1, 2014 to Quarter 1, 2017 is plotted. A key characteristic of 
Ireland’s export performance in 2016 was the difference between services and 
goods exports. The significant reduction in goods exports in 2016, compared with 
2015, was mainly attributable to the reduced levels of contract manufacturing, 
which had greatly increased the 2015 figures. Services exports on the other hand 
increased by over 10 per cent in 2016. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-2108_en.htm. 
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FIGURE 4 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Contract manufacturing is again likely to have a significant impact on the headline 
exports figure in 2017. Figure 5 summarises the year-on-year volume growth 
rates in both goods imports and exports. This suggests negative growth in goods 
exports for the present year. However, this contrasts with information in the 
External Trade Statistics (which excludes contract manufacturing) and suggests 
goods exports are experiencing moderate increases for Quarter 1, 2017. 
 
FIGURE 5 GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (%) VOLUME (QUARTERLY) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Figure 6 plots the quarterly value of Irish exports and imports. There was a 7 per 
cent increase in the value of goods exports for the first six months of 2017 
compared with the same period in 2016. Exports of Other transport equipment 
actually fell by 90 per cent to €65 million in June 2017 while exports of Food and 
live animals increased by 26 per cent compared to the previous year; the dairy 
sector, in particular, observed a substantial increase of €118 million (+77 per 
cent) compared to the same time last year. Medical and pharmaceutical products 
also saw a significant increase over the same period.  
 
The value of goods imports from January to July of 2017 increased by 5 per cent 
compared with the same period for 2016. The largest increase was in Medical and 
pharmaceutical products, which witnessed a 59 per cent increase from €3,436 
million to €5,468 million on a year-to-year basis in 2017. Other transport 
equipment saw the largest decrease of 9 per cent from €8,446 million to €7,674 
million over the same comparative period. Combined, these two goods alone 
represent 30 per cent of the value of goods imported into the State.  
 
FIGURE 6 QUARTERLY GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS VALUE (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The persistent increase in the value of the Euro vis-à-vis Sterling has obvious 
implications for Irish exporters trading with the United Kingdom. However, in 
terms of the value of goods exports, the most recent data do not yet indicate any 
significant slowdown in goods trade between Ireland and the UK. Table 1 
summarises annual changes in exports and imports for the year January to June 
for the UK, the US and the rest of the EU for key commodities. 
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TABLE 1 JANUARY-JUNE ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR THE UK, THE US 
AND THE REST OF EU FOR MAJOR COMMODITIES 
 Exports Imports 
Total – UK 14 3 
Food and live animals 8 39 
Chemicals and related products 49 -6 
Machinery and transport equipment -6 -4 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles -2 -3 
   
Total – Rest of EU 1 0 
Food and live animals 16 9 
Chemicals and related products 3 14 
Machinery and transport equipment -5 -7 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles -16 -4 
   
Total – US 13 8 
Food and live animals 47 -17 
Chemicals and related products 17 117 
Machinery and transport equipment -8 -31 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 20 -8 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As can be seen from the Table, total goods exports between Ireland and the UK, 
in value terms, are up 14 per cent for the period January to June. Exports of 
Chemicals and related products and Food and live animals constituted the largest 
increases. There was also a significant increase in trade with the US, while there 
was relatively little growth overall with the rest of the EU for the same period. 
 
Sentiment indicators such as the Markit Purchasing Manufacturers Index (PMI) 
indicate that latest trends are consistent with the monthly trade data and point 
to a continuing expansion of new export orders for both the services and 
manufacturing sectors in 2017. Based on the latest trends and the expectations of 
strong growth in our major trading partners, it is likely that exports will grow by 
4.5 per cent in 2017 followed by 4.9 per cent in 2018 (Figure 7). As noted in the 
previous Commentary, the robust performance of the Irish labour market and the 
growing levels of consumer demand result in our expectation of import growth of 
6.2 per cent this year and growing a further 7.7 per cent in 2018 (Figure 7). This 
means that the net contribution to GDP from trade is expected to be moderately 
negative both in 2017 and 2018 as a result of the reduction in the level of 
contract manufacturing and a continuing strong level of demand for service 
imports. However, given the highly influential role that developments in contract 
manufacturing and aircraft leasing can have on the terms of trade, these 
forecasts do come with an elevated level of uncertainty. 
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FIGURE 7 IMPORT AND EXPORT GROWTH (2017-2018 FORECASTS) 
 
 
Source: QEC calculations. 
 
Recent developments in the National Accounts have presented particular 
difficulties in interpreting the Balance of Payments. Therefore, along with the 
publication of the new output concept (GNI*), the CSO has also published a 
corresponding modified current account balance measure, known as the Current 
Account*. Similar to the output concept, the adjustment to the current account 
balance focusses on the treatment of the factor income of redomiciled 
companies and the depreciation of foreign-owned domestic capital (such as IP 
and aircraft leasing). In the unadjusted measure of the current account, the 
retained income of redomiciled PLCs is recorded as a direct investment inflow. It 
is only when a dividend is paid to the foreign shareholders that the corresponding 
outflow is recorded, resulting in a decline in the current account balance at that 
time. In the modified current account balance, the incomes of these redomiciled 
plcs are treated as factor income outflows regardless of whether they are 
distributed as dividends or retained. This adjustment has quite an impact on the 
current account; the surplus, which was 3.3 per cent of GDP (4.9 per cent of 
GNI*) fell to 1.2 per cent of GDP (1.8 per cent of GNI*).  
 
Also in the modified current account balance, the depreciation of foreign-owned 
domestic capital (specifically, intellectual property rights (IP) and aircraft leasing) 
is excluded on the basis that this is borne by foreign investors. Given that more 
and more IP and aircraft leasing assets are being relocated to Ireland, the scale of 
depreciation linked to these (predominantly IP) assets has grown significantly and 
amounted to almost €33 billion in 2016. 
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Consequently, when the two adjustments are made to the current account 
balance, the result is quite striking as can be seen from Figure 8. Instead of a 
significant surplus as is the case with the existing current account balance in 2015 
and 2016, the modified measure reports a sizeable deficit. This does suggest a 
significant excess of investment over domestic savings financed by foreign 
borrowing. However, the foreign borrowing is mainly due to the purchase by 
large multinationals of intellectual property assets from their foreign parents and 
the cost of aircraft purchases. Profits from the purchase of these IP and aircraft 
assets will accrue in the future and, consequently, increase future factor income 
inflows. Furthermore, the increase in large depreciation costs, which also adds to 
the modified current account deficit, are offset by an equivalent reduction in 
external liabilities in the Net International Investment Position. 
 
FIGURE 8 EXISTING AND MODIFIED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (€ MILLION): 2005 - 2016 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The Domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then 
discussed, followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and 
housing market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in 
investment and the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the 
public finances. 
 
While growth in taxation revenues appeared to weaken during the first quarter of 
2017, Quarter 2 receipts for headline items such as income tax, corporation tax 
and VAT have all indicated more robust growth. This allied to the continued 
strong performance of the Irish labour market and consumption registering year-
on-year of over 2 per cent, leads us to increase our forecast for GDP to 5 per cent 
in 2017. We also marginally increase our growth rate for 2018 to 4 per cent. 
 
In June the CSO published an adjusted indicator for domestic economic activity, 
GNI*, which is a modified measure of Gross National Income. The measure, which 
was recommended by the Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG), seeks to 
remove from estimates of national income large and volatile items such as 
depreciation on foreign-owned domestic capital assets and retained earnings of 
redomiciled companies. GNI*, in value terms, is now available from 1995 to 2016 
and is derived by subtracting post-tax net operating surplus of foreign investors 
and depreciation of domestic capital owned by foreign investors from GDP. GNI* 
was identical to GNI until 2000 and remained highly correlated up to 2009. Post-
2009 a significant divergence emerged due to increases in factor income of 
redomiciled companies and the substantial rise in depreciation on IP imports in 
2015 and 2016. For example, in 2015 and 2016, depreciation on IP imports 
accounts for over 70 per cent of the gap between GNI and GNI*. 
 
Figure 9 plots both GNI and GNI*. In the Commentary we will also publish 
forecasts of GNI*. However, as we typically forecast both GNP and GDP on the 
basis of some ‘average’ level of factor income and depreciation, our forecasts of 
GNI* are likely to be highly correlated with the standard output concepts. 
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FIGURE 9 GROSS NATIONAL INCOME AND ADJUSTED GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (€ MILLION): 1995 - 
2016 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In the previous Commentary, using output produced by COSMO, Garcia-
Rodriquez examined the likely impact for Irish potential output of a hard Brexit. In 
this next box, again using output from COSMO, Garcia-Rodriquez examines the 
implication for the Irish economy of an increase in public investment as is likely to 
be announced in the Government’s forthcoming Capital Plan. 
 
BOX 1  THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT BY ABIAN GARCIA RODRIGUEZ 
 
By increasing growth and promoting private economic activity, the provision of infrastructure 
and public investment is one of the main prerogatives of any government. In order to reduce 
public expenditure in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis, successive Irish 
governments have significantly reduced levels of capital investment. General government 
gross fixed capital formation dropped, from a peak of €9.7 billion in 2007 to €3.5 billion in 
2012. Even though public investment has recovered some lost ground in recent years, the 
overall level is still well below that of the pre-crisis period. 
To address this, the Government published a Capital Plan in 2014, which set out a six-year 
framework for investment in Ireland to 2021, with total state backed investment amounting 
to €42 billion over the period. Recent Government plans show an acceleration of this 
investment, with gross voted Exchequer capital spending due to rise from €4.2 billion in 2016 
to €7.8 billion in 2021.  
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Such an increase will have a significant effect on the Irish economy, both in the short and the 
long term. The aim of this article, therefore, is to evaluate the impact of this increase of 
public investment on the Irish economy in the medium to long term and on the financial 
position of the Government. This is done through use of the macroeconometric model 
COSMO. 
Some caveats to the analysis should be noted. First, COSMO does not include a ‘productivity 
channel’, where public investment improves the overall behaviour of the economy by raising 
its productivity. The following analysis focuses on the impact of public investment on the 
economy through its effect on internal demand, as opposed to potential long term benefits 
due to improvements in infrastructure. The existence and the size of these potential benefits 
would be heavily dependent on the composition of the investment plan. Second, due to the 
nature of COSMO, our analysis of the impact of public investment is a projection based on 
the historical reactions of the Irish economy to movements in this variable. Consequently, it 
could be the case that the impact of public investment in the future is smaller than in the 
past, due to decreasing returns to investment. On the other hand, investment is considered 
in aggregate terms, without distinguishing between different specific projects. It could also 
be the case, for example, that the composition of the investment plan is tilted towards more 
productivity enhancing projects, which would produce a larger impact than in the past. The 
results presented here should therefore be understood as a middle ground between these 
two potential outcomes, conditioned by the historical evolution of the economy. 
In this exercise, we simulate two different paths of public investment with the goal of 
achieving the aforementioned €7.8 billion figure by 2021; the graphical representations can 
be seen in Figure B.1. Scenario 1 assumes a progressive and linear increase of public 
investment from the current levels to the desired 2021 figure. Scenario 2, on the other hand, 
assumes an extreme case where investment jumps in 2018 to the target level and stays there 
until 2021. The rationale behind this scenario is that there are some economic arguments in 
favour of frontloading an investment plan: on the one hand, public investment increases 
capital, potential output and therefore the long-run growth of the economy; therefore, the 
sooner this investment is realised the better. Similarly, the current environment of low 
interest rates would make it easier for the Government to finance capital projects. After 
2021, the assumption is that public investment will grow at the same rate as the previous 
baseline projection.3 
To improve comparability, Scenario 1 has additional investment in the year 2022 so that 
aggregate additional investment is the same across scenarios for the period of analysis 2017-
2027. Finally, we assume that the plans are debt-financed. The goal of this assumption is to 
ensure that the simulation only captures the effect of the increase in investment and not, for 
example, the effect of a tax increase used to finance the plan. In any case, the evolution of 
the fiscal variables like the deficit or public debt will allow us to observe the potential need 
for the Government to create additional fiscal space to accommodate these investment 
plans. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
3  Baseline from the Economic Outlook, December 2016. 
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FIGURE B.1    OVERVIEW OF SCENARIOS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT PLANS (€ MILLION) 
 
Table B.1 presents the results of the simulation of the two scenarios for public investment. 
The table shows the average deviation from the baseline for each of the simulation periods, 
2018-2022 and 2023-2027, as well as the average deviation from baseline for the whole 
simulation period. The only exception is the Government debt level, which is shown as the 
deviation from baseline on the last indicated period, to better capture the evolution of this 
flow variable. 
TABLE B.1   IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT PUBLIC INVESTMENT SCENARIOS, 2018-2027 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Per cent deviation from Baseline Level, 
average: 2018-2022 
2023-
2027 Avg. 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Avg. 
Gross domestic product at basic prices 0.8 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 
Potential output 0.6 2.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.5 
Gross value added at basic prices, 
Traded sector 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Gross value added at basic prices, Non-
traded sector 0.9 2.5 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Total investment 1.7 4.8 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.1 
Personal consumption of goods and 
services 0.9 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Employed persons 1.1 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.8 
Total wages 1.4 3.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 
              
Deviation from Baseline, average: 2018-2022 2023-2027 Avg. 
2018-
2022 
2023-
2027 Avg. 
Personal consumption deflator 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Unemployment rate -0.7 -1.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.9 -1.0 
General government balance, % GDP -0.3 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 
              
Deviation from Baseline, end of period: 2020.0 2023.0 2027.0 2020.0 2023.0 2027.0 
General government debt, % GDP 0.2 1.4 4.0 0.8 2.0 4.7 
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Irrespective of the scenario considered, an increase in public investment raises economic 
activity. More investment increases the capital stock of the economy, therefore pushing up 
potential output, which helps long-run growth. In the labour market employment goes up, 
with particular intensity in the public sector, and unemployment consequently goes down. 
The combination of more employment and more productive workers, due to the rise of 
capital intensity of the economy, helps push up wages, which in turn increases consumption. 
Therefore, the reaction in the economy is felt mostly through the non-traded sector because 
of the acceleration in internal demand, with a negligible effect on the traded sector. The 
reaction of prices is essentially flat. 
If we compare both scenarios, the intensity of the effects is concentrated on the period 
where the main investment happens; during the first half of the period of analysis for 
Scenario 2, where investment was frontloaded, and during the second half for Scenario 1, 
where the increase in investment was progressive. As expected, the scenario where 
investment is frontloaded obtains slightly better results in terms of GDP and employment, 
because of the initial impact on potential output. However, the difference is small and the 
result for the public finances at the end of the period, measured by the level of public debt as 
a percentage of GDP, is worse. 
For the public finances, the results are clear: despite the positive effect of the increase of 
public investment on economic activity, the plan results in a deterioration of the 
Government’s fiscal position. In both scenarios considered, the government deficit as a 
percentage of GDP is on average slightly above 0.5 percentage points larger than the 
baseline. Therefore, the investment plan would have to be carefully implemented by the 
Government to comply with the fiscal rules.  
In conclusion, the introduction of a plan raising public investment above the current 
projected baseline level would have a positive effect on the economy in the form of 
increased demand, employment and wages, but might require an additional effort from the 
Government to counteract the extra deficit which will arise. Two final remarks to qualify 
these results: first, despite the beneficial economic effects of a public investment plan, the 
current position in the economic cycle of the Irish economy should be taken into account. 
There is the potential for overheating in the economy and expanded government investment 
would contribute to this. As mentioned before, this analysis does not account for potential 
long-run positive effects on productivity; if these materialise they would increase the level of 
potential output in the economy. In any case, implementing a less pro-cyclical profile of 
government activity could help smooth out spending and investment when the next 
downturn occurs. Second, and related to the previous point, the present environment of 
economic growth and low interest rates for government debt in Ireland has an uncertain 
duration and could end abruptly. The current global outlook has a high degree of uncertainty 
with significant downside risk. Therefore the Government must ensure it has the fiscal scope 
to react to any sudden downturns which may occur. 
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MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
Trends in lending  
As noted in the previous Commentary, the Irish financial sector has continued to 
normalise following a period of protracted contraction and instability. Figure 10 
presents the growth rates of credit to households from Irish resident credit 
institutions. The data are split by loans for house purchase and other personal 
loans (auto finance, credit cards, student loans etc.). Overall credit for house 
purchase continues to decline, down -0.6 per cent year-on-year. However, a 
distinguishing feature of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 has been a reduction 
in the pace of deleveraging; the rate of decline has moderated from -2.5 per cent 
in Quarter 2016 pointing towards the ongoing stabilisation in the residential 
housing finance market.  
 
In Quarter 2, 2017, we observe an increase in the growth rate of lending for non-
housing related household loans which are now up 6.4 per cent on a year-on-year 
basis. As these loans are mainly for consumption purposes and auto financing, 
the broader recovery in household spending is undoubtedly leading to an 
increase in demand for this type of financing. However, the rapid increase in the 
rate of growth of these loans which began in mid-2016 requires ongoing 
monitoring to ensure vulnerabilities are not building up through looser lending 
practices. 
 
FIGURE 10 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
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Turning to the provision of credit to non-financial corporations, the overall stock 
of credit is continuing to decline, down by -11.0 per cent in Quarter 2, 2017 year-
on-year. This represents an acceleration in the pace of deleveraging which is in 
contrast to the findings for households. While credit to firms outside the financial 
and property related sectors grew by 3.0 per cent in Quarter 4, 2016 year-on-
year, this has slowed down to a growth rate of 1.9 per cent as of Quarter 2, 2017.  
 
FIGURE 11 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES (%) 
 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics. 
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.14, Growth rates series codes 17, 17.1 and 17.2.  
 
The latest quarterly figures suggest that the financial sector may have some way 
to go yet to fully unwind historical loan balances. Given the legacy issues in the 
Irish banking sector, a better understanding of current developments can be 
gleaned from new lending flows. New lending flows are important as they 
determine how much credit currently is available for households to consume and 
businesses to invest. House prices have climbed strongly in recent months and, in 
line with these trends, new mortgage credit has increased significantly. As can be 
seen in Figure 12, in Quarter 2, 2017 the volume of new mortgage drawdowns 
increased by 18 per cent year-on-year and the value of mortgages increased by 
28 per cent year-on-year. While this represents some moderation in growth rates 
relative to Quarter 1, 2017, the figures point to an acceleration in mortgage 
lending as compared to one year ago. 
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FIGURE 12 YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE OF NEW MORTGAGE DRAWDOWNS (%) 
 
 
Sources: Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
 
As well as monitoring the growth in lending, it is informative to understand 
developments in the average loan size (Figure 13) in the Irish mortgage market. 
The size of the loan matters as, through the debt-service ratio, it determines how 
vulnerable borrowers would be to an interest rate shock or an income shock. If 
indebtedness is increasing this can leave households vulnerable to any negative 
affordability events. As house prices rise, this will inevitably lead to households 
drawing down larger loans. Indeed, as of Quarter 2017, the total average loan 
value has risen to 87 per cent of peak levels from Quarter 1, 2008. While existing 
evidence would suggest that current lending activity is based on prudent credit 
risk assessment (Kinghan et al., 20174), constant monitoring of lending activity is 
required to ensure market stability through good lending practice. 
 
 
                                                          
 
4  Kinghan, C., P. Lyons, Y. McCarthy and C. O’Toole (2017). ‘Macroprudential Measures and Irish Mortgage Lending: An 
Overview of Lending in 2016’, Economic Letters 06/EL/17, Central Bank of Ireland 2017. 
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FIGURE 13 AVERAGE MORTGAGE LOAN SIZE (%) 
 
 
Sources:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
 
As noted in the previous Commentary, with such rapid increases in mortgage 
credit, it is important to understand whether such trends are sustainable or 
whether they constitute a financial stability risk. We still hold the view that 
existing evidence suggests the credit risk of new lending is low and as such does 
not at present pose a threat to banking sector stability. Kinghan et al. (2017) 
highlight the lending conditions under which Irish mortgages were originated in 
2016; loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) ratios were broadly 
unchanged relative to 2015. However, these data do not cover the first half of 
this year and it will be important to review the loan level data which cover this 
period to ensure lending standards are not weakening substantially. If lending 
standards are loosening on a significant basis, and such rapid growth persists, 
corrective policy action may be required.  
 
Another aspect of new lending that provides a guide to the health of the 
domestic economy is lending to small business. Indeed, SMEs have faced very 
challenging financing conditions since the onset of the financial crisis (Gerlach-
Kristen et al., 20155). More recently, loans to Irish small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) have grown steadily in 2016 (Figure 14). This continues the 
trend in overall SME lending which began to increase in 2015 from mid-2014 
lows.  
 
                                                          
 
5  Gerlach-Kristen, P., B. O’Connell and C. O’Toole (2015). Do Credit Constraints Affect SME Investment and 
Employment? The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 51-86. 
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Gross new lending was €1,230 million in Quarter 2, 2017, up from €1,173 million 
one year earlier. Of note is the sectoral allocation of new financing which has 
begun to re-orientate recently towards the construction and domestically non-
traded sectors. Increased credit extension to these sectors is consistent with the 
broadening of the recovery in the domestic economy.  
 
FIGURE 14 QUARTERLY NEW LENDING TO IRISH SMES BY SECTOR (FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Further proof of the improved financing availability for Irish firms is the continued 
reduction in rejection rates for bank financing. Data from the ECB Survey on 
Access to Finance for SMEs (SAFE) provide a benchmark for rejection rates in 
Ireland relative to other European economies. These are presented in Figure 15. 
Following the financial crisis, rejection rates for Irish firms increased considerably, 
and were amongst the highest in the Eurozone. Since mid-2014 rejection rates 
have been declining in Ireland relative to other countries and by early 2016 were 
well below the median in the Euro Area. The most recent data for end 2016 
indicate a pick-up in rejection rates, however more data are needed to 
understand whether this relates to a trend break or a once off. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2 Q4 Q2
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Other
Business services
including ICT and
Finance
Hotels and
restaurants
Wholesale and retail
Construction and real
estate
Manufacturing,
transport and utilities
Primary industries
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 7  |  2 3  
FIGURE 15 AVERAGE REJECTION RATE FOR BANK LOANS - IRISH AND EUROPEAN SMES 
 
 
Source: ECB SAFE Survey. 
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
As we noted in the previous Commentary, the cost of finance in Ireland for both 
corporate and household credit is high in a European context. The standard 
variable rate (SVR) on new mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 3.38 per cent as of 
Quarter 1, 2017; this is down moderately year-on-year from 3.63 in Quarter 1, 
2016. However, comparing Irish new house purchase loans relative to other 
Eurozone economies, it can be seen that new lending rates are the highest of the 
comparison group (Figure 16). As of July 2017, interest rates on new house 
purchase in Ireland were nearly 1.2 per cent higher than the median of the other 
countries presented. This gap has widened since mid-2014 when Irish interest 
rates began to decouple from the ECB policy rate. 
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FIGURE 16 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON 
 
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business SVR is only for new drawdowns.  
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 17 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for non-financial corporates in 
Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 1) 
covering all loans and 2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 which is used as a 
proxy for loans for SMEs. In June 2017, the average rate on new loans for all Irish 
corporates was 2.71 per cent and the Eurozone average was 1.76 per cent. For 
small Irish corporate loans, the interest rate in June 2017 was 5.05 per cent 
compared to the Eurozone average of 2.48 per cent. Interest rates are down year-
on-year for small corporates but remain considerably higher than for their 
European peers.  
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FIGURE 17 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON 
 
 
Sources:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
The evident dislocation in the transmission of policy rates to lending rates in 
Ireland which has occurred since 2014 poses challenges for the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. This dislocation has occurred while the ECB is following an 
extremely accommodative policy stance which cannot be maintained in the 
longer term. Any reversal in rates will pose considerable challenges for key 
sectors in the domestic economy given the degree of leverage amongst private 
sector firms and households.  
 
Household and firm deposits 
In June 2017, household and non-financial corporate deposits stood at €99.9 
billion and €40.0 billion respectively, up from €96.9 billion and €38.1 billion year-
on-year. Loan-to-deposit ratios, presented in Figure 18, continued to be less than 
1 for households indicating they are net funders of the Irish banking sector. 
Corporate deposits remain lower than loans indicating they are net borrowers 
from the Irish banking sector.  
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FIGURE 18 LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIOS FOR IRISH HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS  
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland data. Table A.1 columns 1, 5, 12, 15. It must be noted that these loans and deposits relate to only 
 those held on resident credit institutions reporting to the Central Bank of Ireland’s Credit, Money and Banking data. 
 Securitised loans serviced by these institutions are not included in the above calculations.  
 
Loan performance 
One of the most visible legacies of the Irish financial crisis has been the 
stubbornly high share of non-performing loans. This is particularly pertinent in 
the mortgage market where the share of principal dwelling house mortgages in 
arrears peaked at 12.9 per cent in Quarter 3, 2013. This represented 17.3 per 
cent of the value of outstanding mortgages. More recently, there has been a 
marked fall in the share of loans in arrears to 7.1 per cent as of Quarter 2, 2017. 
This constitutes a total of 10.8 per cent of the balance of outstanding PDH 
mortgages. The default rate on buy-to-let (BTL) loans has also reduced. The 
reduction in mortgage arrears has been driven by falling unemployment, 
recovering house prices as well as concerted policy action to provide 
modifications to distressed borrowers.  
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FIGURE 19 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to principal dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater 
than 90 days past due on their payments.  
 
While further improvements in the domestic economy will act to reduce the 
share of non-performing loans held at Irish banks, in particular in the mortgage 
market, such legacy issues are surely a drag on the sector’s operational activities. 
Continued policy action by the banking sector is required to deal with non-
performing loans and to improve the sustainability of balance sheets which 
should provide better buffers to withstand economic shocks.  
 
Summary of financial conditions 
While the slowing in the pace of deleveraging plus the fall in non-performing 
loans both point to the continued normalisation of activity in the Irish banking 
sector, the recent data suggest this process is far from over. Although new 
lending for mortgages and business is increasing year-on-year, the cost of 
financing remains high and this can impact adversely on consumption and 
investment. The growth of credit for mortgages in particular needs constant 
monitoring to ensure credit risks do not materialise. 
 
PRICES AND EARNINGS 
The start of 2017 saw some upward pressure in the CPI, in June and July 2017 
prices fell again while in August 2017 there was a slight recovery as shown in 
Figure 20 on a year-on-year basis. Consumer price increases continue to remain 
well below historical levels. In the most recent data, year-on-year changes in the 
CPI fell back to -0.4 and -0.2 per cent in June and July 2017 while increasing by 0.4 
per cent in August. The Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) declined 
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by -0.6 per cent in June and -0.2 per cent in July. However, like the CPI, it 
increased by 0.4 per cent year-on-year in August. The increase in overall prices in 
August 2017 was driven mainly by housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
(up 3.2 per cent from August 2016), restaurants and hotels (up 2.6 per cent from 
August 2016) and communications (up 2.3 per cent from August 2016). 
 
Negative influences on the CPI were due to continued decreases in clothing and 
footwear (down 4.8 per cent year-on-year to August 2017) and furnishings, 
household equipment and routine household maintenance (down 3.8 per cent 
year-on-year to August 2017). Prices for recreation and culture fell by 2.4 per 
cent and the prices for food and non-alcoholic beverages decreased by 1.7 per 
cent. 
 
FIGURE 20  ANNUAL GROWTH IN INFLATION (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The underlying recent trends in the CPI (Figure 21) have been steady for some 
time with goods contributing negatively to the overall inflation rate while the 
services component continues to exert a positive effect on overall prices. For the 
most part, this trend is continuing in 2017. While in early 2017, it appeared that 
the goods component had gradually become less negative, this trend has 
reversed in June, July and August as goods prices exerted further downward 
pressure on the CPI.  
 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
CPI -All Items HICP - All Items CPI - Excl Energy
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 7  |  2 9  
FIGURE 21  DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES GROWTH  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Quarter 1 earnings data from the CSO show that seasonally-adjusted Average 
Hourly Earnings increased by 0.5 per cent compared to Quarter 4, 2016. On an 
annual basis they increased by 0.7 per cent up to €22.68. Of the 13 sectors in the 
economy, nine of them experienced an increase in Average Hourly Earnings. The 
largest increase was observed in the transportation and storage sector rising by 
3.0 per cent. Other notable increases occurred in the construction and financial 
and real estate sectors rising by 2.5 per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively. This is 
consistent with the growing demand for labour in these sectors (Figure 22) due to 
the pick-up in construction activity in the first quarter of the year. Comparing the 
public and private sector, similar increases in Average Hourly Earnings were 
observed in the year to Quarter 1, 2017 of 0.7 and 0.9 per cent.  
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FIGURE 22  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER MONTH  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
As economic activity in the broader economy has recovered, pressures are 
beginning to appear in the labour market where average earnings are growing. 
Since Quarter 2, 2016, the average earnings per hour and the average weekly 
earnings have begun to increase pointing towards improved households earnings. 
As of Quarter 2, 2017, the average weekly earnings, on a seasonally-adjusted 
basis, stood at €723.74, this represents a modest increase from €721.74 in 
Quarter 1, 2017. Earnings per hour stood at €22.41 in Quarter 2, 2017 up from 
€22.3 in the previous quarter. 
 
In terms of overall price pressures and competitiveness issues, it is important to 
track in which sectors wages are growing. If the growth in wages is mainly in 
domestically non-traded sectors, this can store up vulnerabilities in terms of a 
loss in competitiveness. The highest weekly wages in Quarter 2, 2017 were in 
financial services and ICT sectors at €1,113 and €1,090 respectively. Wage growth 
appeared to moderate in Quarter 2 in the manufacturing sectors and 
construction sectors, with growth of 1 per cent and 3 per cent respectively on an 
annualised basis. Earning in the wholesale and retail sector grew by 3 per cent on 
an annualised basis, up from 1 per cent in the previous quarter. Figure 23 
presents a four-quarter moving average growth rate by sector to display the 
trends over time in earnings pressures. There is a strong positive trend in the 
construction and accommodation and food services sectors which began to trend 
upward from mid-2016. Public sector earnings are also increasing on an 
annualised basis. 
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FIGURE 23 FOUR-QUARTER MOVING AVERAGE GROWTH BY SECTOR IN WEEKLY EARNINGS 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Overall, trends in recent data indicate that some price and earnings pressures are 
emerging. Consumer prices have begun to increase in August, while housing costs 
are continuing to rise. We therefore expect consumer prices to increase by 1.1 
per cent this year and 1.4 per cent in 2018. We have also revised upwards our 
forecasts for earnings on the back of recent increases in many sectors. We are 
now forecasting earnings to rise by 2.8 per cent this year and 3 per cent in 2018. 
 
TABLE 2  INFLATION MEASURES 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 Annual % Change  
CPI -0.3 0 1.1 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
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DEMAND 
Household Sector Consumption  
A cornerstone of the recent economic recovery has been the strong growth in 
domestic consumption. In 2015, 2016 and for the first quarter of 2017, household 
consumption has continued to grow strongly. The recently released quarterly 
National Accounts show that on an annualised basis, personal consumption 
expenditure increased by 1.3 per cent in Quarter 2, 2017, down from 2.7 per cent 
in the previous quarter. On a quarter-on-quarter basis, consumption spending fell 
marginally. Slowing of consumption growth is mainly driven by the decline in 
motor sales as, with the weakening in Sterling, Irish consumers are increasingly 
purchasing second-hand cars from the UK. We discuss this in more detail below in 
the context of the retail sales data. Despite this development, we still see 
improvements in household balance sheets, the persistent fall in unemployment 
and modest increases in disposable incomes, as providing a supportive 
environment for further consumption growth.  
 
FIGURE 24  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT MARKET 
PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Another important leading indicator for household consumption is developments 
in retail sales. These indicators provide a snapshot into exactly what goods and 
services households are purchasing and where the growth is coming from. Table 
3 presents retail sales for selected items in terms of the annual growth rate in the 
volume of sales. For all businesses retail sales are up 2 per cent in the year to July 
2017. However, this reasonably modest increase masks considerable variation 
across different types of goods. 
19,500
20,000
20,500
21,000
21,500
22,000
22,500
23,000
23,500
24,000
24,500
25,000
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
2
20
10
Q
3
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
1
20
11
Q
2
20
11
Q
3
20
11
Q
4
20
12
Q
1
20
12
Q
2
20
12
Q
3
20
12
Q
4
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
2
20
13
Q
3
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
1
20
14
Q
2
20
14
Q
3
20
14
Q
4
20
15
Q
1
20
15
Q
2
20
15
Q
3
20
15
Q
4
20
16
Q
1
20
16
Q
2
20
16
Q
3
20
16
Q
4
20
17
Q
1
20
17
Q
2
Euro Mn
Growth Y-O-Y
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 7  |  3 3  
TABLE 3 ANNUAL GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (JULY 2017) 
Retail Business – NACE REV 2 Volume of Sales 
  Annual % change 
Motor trades -6.4 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores)  2.6 
Department stores  6.6 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 11.6 
Furniture and lighting 18.1 
All businesses excl. motor trades 7.0 
All businesses 2.1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Much of the sluggishness in retail sales comes from a reduction in activity in the 
motor industry, potentially impacted by the falling value of Sterling which 
cheapens imported cars from the UK. According to recent SIMI data, 44,503 
second-hand cars from the UK were purchased by Irish citizens for the first half of 
2017, representing a 45.9 per cent rise year-on-year on the numbers purchased in 
2016. Considering retail sales without motor trade, we see a rapid increase in 
clothing, footwear and textiles (up 11.6 per cent year-on-year) and furniture and 
lighting (up 18.1 per cent year-on-year). The recovery in the housing market 
would appear to be feeding in to the expenditure on furniture and lighting. The 
overall trends in retails sales are documented in Figure 25. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average of retail sales for the total sales, sales excluding the 
motor trade, and for household equipment. Of note is the high growth in housing 
equipment and the continued strength of all retail sales excluding the motor 
trade.  
 
FIGURE 25  AVERAGE GROWTH IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), THREE- 
MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Figure 26 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which tracks the 
monthly views of households on their current and future economic perspectives. 
While international geopolitical factors were likely to have contributed to a 
weakening of consumer sentiment in mid to late 2016, the first half of 2017 
represented somewhat of a recovery in consumer sentiment. From January to 
July 2017, the index has grown strongly; however the index has softened in 
August 2017 reflecting pessimism amongst consumers in relation to views on 
making large household purchases. Greater investigation of the consumer 
sentiment index highlights the fact that households are still quite optimistic in 
regard to future developments, however this optimism stems from their views on 
the broader economy and the wider labour market. Consumers are much more 
pessimistic in regard to their own personal finances with current and future 
developments seen as resulting in greater budgetary pressures.  
 
These findings would appear to highlight a degree of frustration amongst 
consumers with their views on the broader economy potentially influenced by 
the positive economic information in the news. However, many households are 
not seeing this feed into their own pockets. 
 
FIGURE 26 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC. 
 
Irish household net worth continues to grow into Quarter 4, 2016 as loan 
repayments reduce the stock of outstanding liabilities and rising asset prices raise 
the total value of domestic balance sheets. The trend in the overall position of 
Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial and housing assets 
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minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 27. The financial crisis 
considerably decreased net worth as housing assets fell sharply in value. The 
recovery in the housing market has contributed to a rise in housing wealth which 
has improved overall net worth. Financial assets have grown modestly since 
2010. As households continued to pay down debt balances, the liabilities side is 
further shrinking. 
 
FIGURE 27  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
In general, we expect household consumption to continue to be a strong 
determinant of domestic economic activity as household balance sheets continue 
to be repaired through deleveraging and incomes rise modestly. We therefore 
expect consumption expenditure to grow by 2.6 per cent this year and 2.8 per 
cent in 2018.  
 
Property market developments 
House price growth has continued to pick up into 2017 following an acceleration 
in the rate of increase during the second half of 2016. Figure 28 plots the year-on-
year changes in residential property prices. The data are split out by property 
type as well as for the overall index. While prices have been accelerating 
throughout 2017, June and July have seen double digit annual growth: prices 
were up 11.1 per cent in the year to June and 11.6 per cent in the year to July. 
The rate of growth for houses is somewhat faster than that for apartments 
potentially reflecting household demand for family homes. 
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FIGURE 28 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
House price developments are presented in Figure 29 on a geographic basis 
splitting out Dublin and the rest of Ireland. As housing pressures are most acute 
in the capital such a dichotomy provides insight into relative trends. It is clear that 
the deceleration of price growth in Dublin in early 2015 was much more acute 
than outside the capital. Among other factors, this potentially reflects the fact 
that the Central Banks’ macroprudential rules in the housing market were more 
tightly binding for Dublin borrowers who needed to use high loan-to-value and 
loan-to-income ratios to purchase housing. Kinghan et al. (2017) provide some 
recent evidence of this. Furthermore, the looser loan-to-income cap for first time 
buyers purchasing properties less than €220,000 would have meant stricter limits 
in Dublin where average prices were higher. More recently the rest of the country 
has been growing very rapidly, posting double digit growth every month with one 
exception since July 2016. Prices in Dublin grew at 11.1 per cent in the year to 
June 2017 suggesting an acceleration in price increases in the capital where 
demand still greatly exceeds supply. 
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FIGURE 29 ANNUAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Further insight can be gleaned from the ESRI/AIB House Price Index which is 
presented in Figure 30 and plots the latest ESRI/AIB housing market indicator. 
The index, which comprises questions on attitudes to buying and selling property 
as well as expectations of house prices 12 months from now, has started to trend 
upwards from the mid-point of 2016. This growth continued into Quarter 2, 2017.  
 
FIGURE 30 ESRI/AIB HOUSE PRICE INDEX 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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While it is clear that excess demand in the housing market is leading to rapid 
increases in house prices, similar challenges are also being faced in the rental 
market where rents are also growing rapidly. The latest data from the RTB rental 
index confirm that rents nationally continue to increase at a significant rate. 
Rents in Quarter 2, 2017, nationally, increased by 7 per cent on an annual basis 
continuing the rise that has been observed since early 2013 as can be seen from 
Figure 31. While it does appear that there is some moderation in the rate of 
growth in Dublin, rents are now above their pre-crisis peak experienced in 
Quarter 4, 2007. Pressures in the rental market will continue to reduce housing 
affordability. 
 
FIGURE 31 RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES BOARD NATIONAL RENTAL INDEX: Q3 2007 = 100 
 
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
Undoubtedly price pressures are due to the acute shortage of housing supply. 
Duffy et al. (2016)6 note that approximately 35,000 units are needed per annum 
to keep up with demand due to demographics and market fundamentals. As 
there has been a number of years where supply has been less than this, the 
number needs to be exceeded in the short run in order for supply to ‘catch up’. At 
present a total of 12,600 completions were supplied in 2015 and just under 
15,000 units last year. However, it does appear that housing supply is finally 
beginning to respond to increased demand. ESB connections data (our proxy for 
completions) up to May this year have far exceeded the monthly level in the 
previous two years. With continued demand-side pressures and a recovering 
 
                                                          
 
6  Duffy, D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2016). ‘Macroprudential policy in a recovering property market: too much 
too soon?’ International Journal of Housing Policy, Vol. 16, Issue 4, pp. 491-523. 
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financial sector leading to better access to credit, we expect completions to 
continue to rise. We forecast that 19,000 units will be finalised in 2017, with the 
number increasing to 24,000 units in 2018. 
 
FIGURE 32 MONTHLY LEVELS OF HOUSING SUPPLY 
 
 
Sources:  Department of Housing Planning and Local Government and QEC calculations. 
 
SUPPLY 
Investment 
A noteworthy aspect of the financial crisis has been the dramatic decline, then 
relative stagnation, in capital investment across Europe (European Investment 
Bank, 2017).7 Following a heightened reliance on investment in building and 
construction, Ireland suffered very large peak-to-trough falls in capital investment 
from 2007 to 2011. More recently, investment has recovered somewhat. Total 
investment as measured by Gross Physical Capital Formation (GFCF) increased in 
2014, 2015, and 2016 as shown by Figure 33. In 2016, annual growth was 61 per 
cent, up from 28 per cent in 2015. These apparent rises in investment are 
problematic in terms of understanding economic behaviour in Ireland as the 
growth is largely being driven by an increase in intangible assets which are more 
to do with changes in national accounting treatment than underlying economic 
activity.  
 
                                                          
 
7  European Investment Bank (2017). ‘Investment and Investment Finance in Europe 2016’, European Investment Bank 
Annual Report, Luxembourg. 
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FIGURE 33  GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION LEVELS AND GROWTH RATES (2010-2016) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC calculations. Some data have been withheld by the CSO for data privacy reasons.  
 
The scale of the increases can be better seen in an international context. Figure 
34 presents the growth rates for capital investment for Ireland and selected other 
European countries over the period 1996-2016. While investment in Ireland has 
historically displayed a significant degree of volatility, the dramatic rise in the 
investment growth rate in 2014, 2015 and 2016 is evident as Ireland went from 
close to the European average in 2013 to the highest by a considerable degree in 
recent years. 
 
FIGURE 34 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION GROWTH RATES – CHAIN LINKED VOLUMES (2005=100) 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat, countries included in comparison are: BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, GR, ES, FR, Croatia, IT, CY, LT, LV, HU, NL, AT, PL, PT, 
RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK.  
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Figure 35 decomposes gross fixed capital investment on a quarterly basis into the 
underlying components of buildings and construction, intangibles, and machinery 
and equipment. It can be seen that the large spike in investment coincides with 
the significant increase in intangible assets which went from an average of €2,500 
million per quarter in 2013 to over €12,000 million per quarter in 2016. The 
growth rate of building and construction activities is much more stable growing 
by a modest and consistent rate. Machinery and equipment investment, while 
not as volatile as intangibles, also displays a high degree of variation. 
 
Typically, our knowledge of investment activity should relate to the degree to 
which firms’ investment is driven by their fundamental profits and economic 
performance. Using the National Accounts, the current increases – driven by the 
relocation of assets by multinationals for within-company balance sheet, 
international operations strategies and after tax profitability management 
purposes – pose serious challenges in understanding the capital asset position of 
Irish companies. In particular, our ability to forecast such series is undermined 
when the drivers of activity are individual company strategies and not general 
economic factors.  
 
FIGURE 35 COMPONENTS OF INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data. 
 
To attempt to address these issues the CSO has provided an adjusted series for 
gross fixed capital formation on a quarterly basis, modified GFCF, which adjusts 
for the effects of trade in aircraft by aircraft leasing companies and the 
importation of intellectual property. The adjusted figures overall and for building 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
20
06
Q
1
20
06
Q
3
20
07
Q
1
20
07
Q
3
20
08
Q
1
20
08
Q
3
20
09
Q
1
20
09
Q
3
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
3
20
11
Q
1
20
11
Q
3
20
12
Q
1
20
12
Q
3
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
3
20
14
Q
1
20
14
Q
3
20
15
Q
1
20
15
Q
3
20
16
Q
1
20
16
Q
3
20
17
Q
1
Intangible Assets Machinery and Equipment Building and Construction GFCF
42 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  A ut um n  20 1 7  
and construction, intangibles and machinery and equipment are presented in 
Figure 36. It can be seen the adjusted data display a much more stable growth 
pattern with an upward trend evident from mid-2015 onwards. For the year 
2016, the overall level of GFCF is, on average, 380 per cent higher than the 
modified figures for intangibles, and 50 per cent higher for machinery and 
investment. Building and construction is unaffected. On an annualised basis 
overall modified investment is up 10 per cent in the year to Quarter 2, 2017. This 
is composed of an increase of 13 per cent in buildings and construction, a 14 per 
cent decline in machinery and equipment and a 32 per cent increase in 
intangibles. 
 
FIGURE 36 MODIFIED GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data. 
 
While the modified figures go some way to addressing the accounting challenges, 
the difficulties in providing a measure of gross fixed capital investment in a highly 
globalised and multinational dominated economy remain. Indeed, the degree to 
which Irish companies are investing or divesting remains poorly understood and 
is really the important consideration when it comes to policymaking and 
industrial development strategy. Further research is required to better 
understand the investment patterns of Irish companies relative to the large 
multinationals.  
 
To provide some insight into the enterprises current thinking, the Markit 
Purchasing Manager’s Index, provides another source of activity in the 
manufacturing, services and constructions sectors. It is shown in Figure 37.  
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A reading above 50 indicates an expansion and, in the first few months of 2017, 
we can see that the index is beginning to trend upwards for construction and 
remains well above 50 for manufacturing and services. The most recent data for 
June 2017 suggest the strength of the construction purchasing activity has 
moderated somewhat but it remains in expansion. 
 
FIGURE 37 BUSINESS AND CONSTRUCTION PMI FOR IRELAND 
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
The level of uncertainty in the global environment and ongoing Brexit discussions 
are potentially causing some headwinds for investment planning. A recent survey 
of companies undertaken by the Department of Business, Enterprise and 
Innovation shows some companies have already responded by reducing their 
investment activity in light of Brexit (DBEI, 2017).8 This uncertainty may be 
reflected in a weakening of the business outlook for purchasing activity as 
monitored by the Markit index presented in Figure 38. For both manufacturing 
and services activity the most recent June 2017 data indicate a softening of 
activity.  
 
 
                                                          
 
8  Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation (2017). ‘Survey on: Brexit – the view of Irish SMEs’, available 
online at: https://dbei.gov.ie/en/Publications/Brexit-the-view-of-Irish-SMEs.html. 
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FIGURE 38 FORWARD-LOOKING INDICATORS FOR PURCHASING ACTIVITY  
 
 
Source:  Markit. 
 
Despite the uncertainty in some forward-looking business indicators, our overall 
outlook for investment remains positive. The international uncertainties 
notwithstanding, the increased trend in building investment is expected to 
continue as it is underpinned by strong housing demand.  
 
Consequently, we maintain an optimistic position for overall investment in 2017 
and 2018. In particular, we expect annual average growth in investment of 15.6 
per cent in 2017 and 12 per cent in 2018. 
 
FIGURE 39 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2017-2018 FORECASTS TO 2016 ACTUAL) 
 
 
Sources:  Department of Environment and QEC Forecasts. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Manufacturing Outlook
Services Outlook
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  A ut um n 2 01 7  |  4 5  
In light of the Government’s forthcoming updated Capital Plan and the significant 
increase in capital expenditure which is envisaged, in Box 2 Morgenroth draws 
out some important policy lessons to be learned from the previous period of 
increased public expenditure. 
 
BOX 2  THE PUBLIC CAPITAL PROGRAMME BY EDGAR MORGENROTH 
 
The debate on public capital tends to be focused on investment levels over the last few 
years, yet what matters for the economy is not how much was spent on infrastructure last 
year but the adequacy of the stock of infrastructure. The stock of infrastructure is the 
accumulated investment over many years accounting for the deterioration of what was put 
in place as well as obsolescence.9 It is, therefore, important to consider public investment 
over the long run. 
Comparing Ireland’s public investment spending as a share of GDP over the period 1970 to 
2015 with that of other EU15 countries reveals that investment in Ireland was above average 
over that period.10 As GDP is not an ideal scaling factor for Ireland an alternative is to 
compare real investment per capita across countries. Using this variable Ireland’s public 
investment is found to be just below the average for EU15 countries. However, Ireland’s 
public investment is the second most volatile of the EU15 countries reflecting the pro-cyclical 
nature of public investment in Ireland, where expenditure is ramped up significantly when 
economic growth is strong and reduced during recessions.  
Importantly, the value of the investment is not necessarily equal to its cost (see Pritchett, 
1996). For example during the last two decades the motorway network was constructed, 
which has significantly reduced drive times, and thus yields a significant return. Constructing 
another set of motorways parallel to the existing motorway will yield little additional return 
but would be very costly (see Fernald, 1999). In this context it is also important to note that 
the current low financing costs do not imply that projects are cheap, they only imply that 
they are cheap to finance. 
It is, therefore, more important to consider what projects are required and where, rather 
than only debating the level of investment. The projects with the highest return (value) are 
those that address key development constraints (e.g. transport bottlenecks) or important 
societal goals (e.g. addressing homelessness). In deciding on the right projects and their 
location, Ireland’s climate change obligation as well as the need to adapt to climate change, 
for example in terms of flood defences, also need to be considered. 
The medium- to long-term outlook for Ireland suggests that the economy is likely to grow 
significantly and that this will be accompanied by substantial population growth (see Bergin 
et al., 2016), which implies a need for more infrastructure. The development pattern over the 
last two decades has been for growth to be concentrated in Dublin and surrounding  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  Significant portions of the London Underground were constructed in the 19th Century; similarly, most of the Irish 
railway network was also constructed in the 19th Century. In addition, most regional and local roads were 
constructed many decades ago. The age of some infrastructure also implies increased investment in maintenance 
and replacement. 
10  Based on data from the DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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countries, resulting in significant sprawl and congestion in that part of Ireland, while other 
parts have lost population and services. This has had negative impact on quality of life, has 
economic costs and has also significant negative environmental consequences, both in terms 
of climate change and local pollution.  
It will be important to achieve a more efficient spatial development pattern in the future 
where regional development is more balanced but where the special role of Dublin is not 
undermined. To this end the Department of Housing, Planning, Communities and Local 
Government (DHPCLG) is currently preparing a new National Planning Framework (see 
DHPCLG, 2017). In the past the National Development Plans were either not informed by any 
spatial development strategy or they were poorly aligned which reduced the effectiveness of 
the National Spatial Strategy significantly (see Morgenroth, 2013). In this context it is 
significant to note that the Minister for Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform has 
committed to align the public capital programme with the National Planning Framework 
(NPF) that will replace the National Spatial Strategy (NSS).  
A key constraint in rebalancing growth across the country has been the lack of scale of the 
second tier cities compared to Dublin, which limits their potential as a driver for growth of 
their wider hinterland, thus reinforcing the importance of Dublin. Therefore the NPF should 
aim to develop the scale of these cities, while allowing Dublin as the only city of international 
scale to continue to grow. Achieving such a more compact spatial development pattern 
would not only have regional development benefits but would also help in addressing climate 
change challenges. Importantly such an outcome can only be achieved by targeting 
infrastructure appropriately. Continuing with the current approach that spreads investment 
widely will perpetuate the current development patterns that increase the dominance of 
Dublin. Investment in second tier cities, through channels such as water and wastewater 
infrastructure as well as public transport, will instead need to be facilitated if we are to allow 
for a more balanced distribution of growth to occur within the State. 
The highly cyclical nature of public investment has a number of negative implications. Firstly, 
at times of low public investment, employment in related sectors – and particularly in 
construction – declines with some workers leaving the country while other leave the sectors 
altogether. Firms also reduce their investment and sell off machinery that is not needed. 
Thus the capacity of the sectors reduces significantly, which means that when public 
investment is ramped up there is not enough capacity to supply this demand resulting in 
inflation. It is thus not surprising to find that investment inflation in Ireland was the highest 
of all EU15 countries over the period 1970 to 2015. According to National Accounts data, 
prices for roads have increased by almost 50 per cent between 1995 and 2016, while 
consumer prices increased by just over 34 per cent. Importantly, the price of road 
construction increased by almost double the rate of the Consumer Price Index over the 
period 1995 to 2007 when public investment was significantly ramped up in Ireland and at a 
time when housing construction was also increased significantly.  
A second implication of the cyclicality of public investment is that during periods of low 
investment expenditure on maintenance is often also reduced which impacts negatively on 
the condition of the existing infrastructure stock, increasing the need for more expensive 
replacement. The investment cycle also leads to cyclical maintenance and replacement cycles 
and of course during periods of low investment a backlog of projects builds up that if dealt 
with will perpetuate the cyclical nature of investment. 
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In summary, while there is undoubtedly a need to increase public investment, the benefits of 
investment are crucially dependent on the identification of the right projects in the right 
places. If Ireland is to achieve more sustainable and regionally balanced development then 
public investment needs to support the National Planning Framework. Importantly, the 
recent experience has shown that ramping up investment at a time when housing 
construction output is also increasing can lead to significant construction price inflation. 
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LABOUR MARKET 
Unemployment 
Given the continuing strong performance of the economy, the number of people 
out of work in the Irish labour market continues to decline through 2017. On a 
seasonally-adjusted basis the Live Register recorded a monthly decrease of 7,300 
(-2.9 per cent) in August 2017, resulting in a seasonally-adjusted total of 256,800. 
This represents an annual decrease of 51,762 (-16.4 per cent). As can be seen 
from Figure 40, the number of persons on the Live Register in August 2017 is now 
the lowest number recorded in the seasonally-adjusted series since October 
2008.  
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FIGURE 40 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: MONTH 1, 2006 TO MONTH 8, 2017 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Whereas during the initial phase of the economic recovery, it was the shorter-
term unemployed who had the largest decline in the Live Register, since mid-
2015 it is those in longer-term unemployment who are now experiencing the 
more significant falls. 
 
In terms of the last occupation held by those on the Live Register, Table 4 
summarises the annual change between 2016 and 2017. 
 
TABLE 4  PERSONS (‘000) ON THE LIVE REGISTER CLASSIFIED BY LAST HELD OCCUPATION 
Sector 2016 M08 2017 M08  % Change 
Managers and administrators 14.0 12.2 -13 
Professional 21.9 17.9 -18 
Associate professional and technical 9.5 8.6 -9 
Clerical and secretarial 37.1 30.1 -17 
Craft and related 54.8 44.7 -18 
Personal and protective services 40.0 33.4 -16 
Sales 33.9 28.3 -17 
Plant and machine operatives 48.1 40.0 -17 
Other groups 36.8 31.5 -14 
No occupation 20.0 16.9 -15 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
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Notwithstanding the recent pick-up in construction sector, the occupational 
group with the largest number of people on the Live Register is still the craft and 
related sectors. However, the craft and related sector also registers the largest 
decrease over the past year. 
 
On a month-to-month basis, the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate fell 
marginally in August to 6.3 per cent. The figure is down from 7.9 per cent in 
August 2016.  
 
Employment 
The latest employment data show that the number of persons in employment is 
now 2,063,000, which represents a 2.4 per cent increase on Quarter 2, 2016. Full-
time employment increased by 77,800 (+5.0 per cent) to 1,630,800 during the 
same period and accounted for 79.0 per cent of total employment in Quarter 2, 
2017. On the other hand, part-time employment fell by 29,700 (-6.4 per cent) to 
432,200 and accounted for 21.0 per cent of total employment. The number of 
persons in employment has increased by 201,700 (+10.8 per cent) between 
Quarter 2, 2011 and Quarter 2, 2017. Full-time employment (+207,000) 
accounted for virtually all of this increase while there was a very slight increase in 
part-time employment. This indicates some significant changes in the 
composition of employment in the Irish labour market.  
 
Total labour supply can be decomposed into total numbers employed times the 
average workweek. McQuinn and Whelan (2015),11 for example, have noted the 
decline in the average workweek across Euro Area countries, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. In Table 5 the average workweek for the main NACE Rev2 
sectors is presented for 2017. Growth rates between 1998 and 2017 are also 
presented. 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, 
ESRI Working Paper, WP501. 
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 TABLE 5  AVERAGE USUAL HOURS WORKED PER WEEK BY PERSONS AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER 
IN EMPLOYMENT (ILO) (‘000) BY QUARTER AND NACE REV 2 ECONOMIC SECTOR: 1998 - 2017 
Sector 2017 Q1 1998 Q1 – 2017 Q1 % 
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing 48.2 -10 
Industry 38.9 -3 
Industry and Construction 39.0 -4 
Construction 39.1 -6 
Services 34.4 -5 
Wholesale and retail trade 33.8 -10 
Transportation and Storage 38.1 -10 
Accommodation and Food Services 31.3 -10 
Information and Communication 39.3 0 
Financial, Insurance and Real Estate 38.3 0 
Professional and Scientific 38.7 -4 
Administrative and support 33.3 -1 
Public Administration 37.1 -3 
Education 29.5 1 
Human Health 33.1 -2 
Other NACE 32.3 -3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Of all sectors, agriculture forestry and fishing has the longest workweek at 48.2 
hours; this is somewhat greater than the sector with the next longest workweek, 
construction at 39.1 hours. However, similar to the results found in McQuinn and 
Whelan (2015) for a cross-country sample, it appears that the average Irish 
workweek is on a long-term downward trend. From the table it is clear that only 
one sector, education, registers an increase in the average workweek over the 
period 1998 to 2017.  
 
One issue of importance in the short-term is gauging whether the Irish economy 
is operating near to or in excess of its potential level. This is particularly pertinent 
in the framing of the most appropriate fiscal policy. Given the anomalies with the 
National Accounts, there are difficulties with generating traditional estimates of 
the output gap. One way to evaluate the growth capacity within the economy is 
to examine long-run trends in the unemployment rate. Figure 41 plots Irish 
unemployment rates from 1960 to the present. 
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FIGURE 41  IRISH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%): 1960 - 2017 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
As can be seen the Irish labour market is characterised by significant volatility 
since 1960 with adverse periods in the 1980s and the late 2000s standing out. 
From this it is quite difficult to ascertain a long-run unemployment rate; however 
if we focus on the period 1999-2008, it is apparent that the unemployment rate 
was some way below the current 6.3 per cent. Over that period the 
unemployment rate averaged exactly 5 per cent. If we take the period 1960 to 
1974, the average unemployment rate was 5.6 per cent – again somewhat less 
than the current rate. What this suggests is that if one treats the 1980s and the 
post-2008 period as being somewhat uncharacteristic of the Irish labour market, 
then there is still some spare capacity left in the market. In compiling a new 
measure of labour utilisation, the Non-Employment Index (NEI), Byrne and 
Conefrey (2017)12  come to broadly the same conclusion. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
While we have revised our growth forecasts upwards somewhat, we have left our 
forecasts for the labour market relatively unchanged since the last Commentary. 
Therefore, we believe that the unemployment rate will average 6.1 per cent 
through 2017 and 5.4 per cent through 2018. Employment is set to exceed 2.24 
million by the end of 2017 and increase up to 2.27 by the end of 2018. 
 
 
                                                          
 
12  Byrne S. and T. Conefrey (2017). ‘A Non-Employment Index for Ireland. Central Bank of Ireland’, Economic Letter, Vol. 
2017, No. 9. 
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PUBLIC FINANCES 
The first quarter of 2017 saw weak returns for most of the headline taxation 
items with the resulting total being less than the expected (profile) level for that 
period. However, in Quarter 2 it is evident that the growth rate across most items 
and particularly large items such as income tax, corporation tax and customs has 
all improved. Figure 42 illustrates the annual changes in taxation returns for the 
period January-August for the last four years for the main tax categories as well 
as the overall total amount. 
 
FIGURE 42 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%) FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY - 
AUGUST 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
While overall growth rates are slightly less than in previous years, the pace of 
increase is still significant and looks set to meet expected levels for the current 
year.  
 
The increase in income tax for the year to date at 5.1 per cent and the 
accelerated increase in PRSI receipts are now more in line with developments in 
the Irish labour market. With employment growing at an annualised rate of 2.4 
per cent and the unemployment rate at 6.3 per cent, the growth in labour-related 
taxation items earlier in the year had looked somewhat weak. However, it would 
appear recent developments in revenue growth are more correlated with 
observed developments in the labour market.  
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Overall, when combining forecasts on the revenue side with likely developments 
in Government expenditure, we forecast a deficit for the present year of 0.5 per 
cent of GDP. We also believe that a mild deficit of 0.2 per cent is likely in 2018. 
 
Given the proximity of the budget it is appropriate to examine recent trends in 
Government expenditure. In Figure 43 we plot total net voted Government 
expenditure since 1999. This is split into both current and capital components. 
 
FIGURE 43 IRISH GOVERNMENT NET VOTED EXPENDITURE (€ MILLIONS): 1999 - 2016 
 
 
Source:  Department of Finance. 
 
From the graph, the substantial increase in Government expenditure during the 
pre-2007 period is evident. Post-2008 total expenditure did reduce, however it is 
clear that most of the reduction occurred on the capital side as opposed to 
expenditure on current items. From 2008 onwards current expenditure remained 
constant at around €40 billion, whereas capital expenditure which peaked in 
2008 at €8.5 billion fell to just over €3 billion in 2013.  
 
Since 2013 the Government also publishes forecasts of both capital and current 
expenditure for the year ahead.13 Figure 44 plots actual and forecast total 
expenditure since 2014; in all cases actual expenditure is greater than the 
forecast with the difference particularly large in 2015. 
 
 
                                                          
 
13   These forecasts are for gross as opposed to net expenditure. Net expenditure is lower than gross spend, because it 
takes account of ‘appropriations-in-aid’, i.e. fees, levies and other receipts which Departments and agencies may 
retain and use towards their overall spend. 
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FIGURE 44 ACTUAL AND PROFILE TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (€ MILLION); 2014 - 2016 
 
 
Source:  Department of Finance. 
 
Figure 45 plots the same graph for current expenditure. It is clear that most of the 
‘forecast error’ is on the current side. The average scaling factor between the 
actual and profile amounts is 1.02; on that basis, expenditure for the present year 
is more likely to be €54,551 million as opposed to the forecast amount of €53,530 
million. 
 
FIGURE 45 ACTUAL AND PROFILE CURRENT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (€ MILLION); 2014 - 2016 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
The publication by the CSO of the adjusted level indicator of the size of the 
domestic economy, GNI*, is particularly useful in assessing the public finances. By 
reflecting more accurately the underlying nature of economic activity in the 
domestic economy it provides arguably a clearer picture as to the ability of the 
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economy to service its sovereign debt obligations. In Figure 46, following previous 
Commentaries where we had plotted the debt-to-GDP with an adjusted GDP 
series, in this case we now plot the debt-to-GDP ratio along with a plot of the 
debt-to-GNI*. In both cases the ratio is declining in a persistent manner, however 
it is important to note that in 2016, the debt-to-GDP ratio is 22.3 percentage 
points lower than debt-to-GNI*. 
 
FIGURE 46 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
 
In a box in the Output section Garcia-Rodriguez examines the implications of the 
Government’s aim to increase capital expenditure to €7.8 billion by 2021. While 
there are positive outcomes in terms of higher growth and lower unemployment 
as a result of such an increase, Garcia-Rodriguez also estimates that this will 
increase the general government balance by 0.5 per cent over the period. 
Consequently, the plan will have to be carefully implemented so as to comply 
with the fiscal rules. 
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General Assessment 
 
The Irish economy continues to increase at a significant pace in 2017. While 
certain taxation items registered relatively weak growth in the earlier part of the 
year, more recent Exchequer returns indicate that the total taxation take for 2017 
is on course to meet expectations. At this point in the year, overall receipts are up 
by almost 5 per cent with respect to the same time last year. Additionally, the 
labour market has witnessed continued improvement throughout 2017 with 
unemployment now down to just over 6 per cent. Employment growth, which is 
currently broadly based throughout the economy, is approximately 2.5 per cent 
per annum. On the basis of the stronger revenue numbers we now revise 
upwards our growth forecast for GDP to 5.0 per cent for the present year. We 
also marginally increase our forecast for GDP in 2018 to 4.0 per cent. While there 
is ongoing debate as to the exact degree of output growth due to different 
national accounting issues, the strength of the tax returns alongside the 
persistent decline in unemployment indicates that economic activity is continuing 
apace.  
 
The pressing challenge for policymakers at present is the need to frame the most 
appropriate fiscal policy given the pace of economic growth. In particular, is the 
economy at or near its sustainable (potential) level of output? Some 
commentators have, for example, called for a contractionary fiscal policy in light 
of the economy’s recent performance.  
 
Framing a prudent budgetary policy in the present context is challenging for a 
number of reasons; while the economy is exhibiting particularly strong growth 
rates, which would suggest that fiscal policy should at least remain relatively 
neutral, after the financial downturn there is a clear need for greater investment 
in key areas such as social housing, the water network, primary day care centres 
etc. The situation is further complicated by the uncertainty concerning the ‘true’ 
rate of economic growth owing to the different issues surrounding the Irish 
National Accounts. Accurate estimation of key fiscal metrics such as the output 
gap necessitates that the reported level of GDP underpinning the estimate is truly 
reflective of the actual domestic increase in economic activity. Thus, the current 
budgetary policy faces a delicate balancing act of simultaneously ensuring the 
economy does not overheat while ensuring sufficient levels of investment occur 
over the medium term. 
 
Given the difficulties with the National Accounts at present, it is very challenging 
to get a formal assessment of the Irish output gap. Although the unemployment 
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rate has fallen quite sharply to 6.3 per cent there is still some capacity left in the 
Irish labour market and recent trends in both wage growth and general inflation 
are still reasonably moderate. Overall, therefore, this would indicate that 
traditional estimates of sustainability do not indicate that the economy is 
overheating. While the new modified measure of the current account balance 
does indicate a deficit in 2015 and 2016, as noted in the Trade section of the 
Commentary, a large portion of the foreign borrowing contributing to the deficit 
position is mainly due to the purchase by large multinationals of intellectual 
property assets from their foreign parents and the cost of aircraft purchases.  
 
However, a further issue which arises in estimating sustainable levels of activity in 
an economy is the greater need, post the financial crisis, to incorporate 
information about the financial cycle into measures of potential output and 
output gaps. A significant body of work at the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS)14 has examined how information about the financial cycle can yield 
measures of potential output and output gaps that are not only estimated more 
precisely, but also much more robust in real time. This would seem to be 
particularly important in the Irish context where the presence of the large 
construction-related credit bubble in the lead up to 2007 was one of the main 
reasons for the substantial imbalances which took place in the Irish economy.  
 
Since the economic recovery started in 2013, the performance of the Irish credit 
market has lagged behind the real economy; stocks of credit have been falling 
consistently since 2008 and positive growth rates in new lending have only lately 
started to emerge.  
 
Consequently, when estimates of the financial cycle and more traditional 
estimates of the output gap are examined in the present climate, it suggests the 
economy is not yet overheating. However, the growth of residential property 
prices coupled with the pace of acceleration in mortgage credit suggest that 
sector specific pressures may be building. For example in the residential property 
market where demand far exceeds current supply, policymakers should ensure 
that existing, significant demand-side pressures are not further exacerbated 
through fiscal measures such as a revision of the help-to-buy scheme or any 
loosening of macroprudential rules in the mortgage market.  
 
 
                                                          
 
14   Borio C. (2012). ‘The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?’, Bank of International Settlements 
Working Papers, No. 395.  
Borio C., Disyatat and M. Juseluis (2013). ‘Embedding information about the financial cycle’, Bank of International 
Settlements Working Papers, No. 404.  
Borio C., Disyatat and M. Juseluis (2014). ‘A parsimonious approach to incorporating economic information in 
measures of potential output’, Bank of International Settlements Working Papers, No. 442. 
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Combining these different threads of analysis would suggest that, at present, the 
most appropriate course of action for the Government to take is a neutral fiscal 
stance. Namely that fiscal policy should neither seek to additionally stimulate nor 
contract economic activity above and beyond what is forecast to occur. While 
there is some research to indicate that Irish households may move on to higher 
rates of taxation at relatively lower income levels than comparator OECD 
countries, if changes in the taxation system do occur, it would be advisable for 
these measures to be neutral overall i.e. offset by increases in taxation 
elsewhere. 
 
The Government is also set to publish a review of the Capital Plan, the aim of 
which is to inform decisions on revised capital allocations in the context of 
Budget 2018. The increased level of economic activity and the improvement in 
the fiscal accounts has led to calls for greater levels of public investment. To 
assess the potential implications of a greater level of investment on economic 
activity, we have included a box in the Commentary by Garcia-Rodriquez. Garcia-
Rodriquez illustrates that increasing capital expenditure to €7.8 billion will lead to 
greater levels of economic activity in terms of higher output growth and lower 
unemployment vis-à-vis baseline levels. Quantifying the impacts of such a plan is 
particularly important in light of potential overheating which may occur in the 
domestic economy. As also noted in the box, the Capital Plan has implications for 
the public finances. 
 
In another box in the Commentary Morgenroth outlines lessons to be learned 
from the previous period of significant capital investment undertaken by the 
State. Morgenroth notes that merely because financing costs are currently low 
does not imply that capital projects are cheap, only that they are cheap to 
finance. In the present context, Morgenroth argues that projects with the highest 
return (value) are those that address key development constraints (e.g. transport 
bottlenecks) or important societal goals (e.g. addressing homelessness). Also 
policy coherence is imperative in this regard as any significant increase in capital 
expenditure must support and complement the recently published National 
Planning Framework (NDF). 
 
The most significant policy challenge facing both the current and next 
government is the challenge of successfully ‘managing the boom’. Namely, how 
to progress from an economy such as Ireland’s which is rapidly recovering from a 
significant economic and financial shock and consequently enjoying elevated 
rates of economic growth into a more stable period of sustainable activity over 
the medium term. 
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As increasing attention is devoted to implications for the Irish economy of Brexit, 
a hard border on the island of Ireland would act as a significant impediment to 
the increasingly integrated nature of certain sectors of the economy such as the 
agri-food industry (Lawless and Studnicka, 2017).15 If costly customs inspections 
as well as all the other border formalities and barriers to trade which existed 
before 1992 are to be avoided, then the UK must remain a member of the 
Customs Union. If the UK does leave both the Customs Union and the Single 
Market, the cost of doing business for many Irish firms with counterparts in 
Northern Ireland or the rest of the UK will increase. The negotiating position 
currently employed by the EU Commission seeks to achieve agreement on three 
core issues (the cost of the Brexit ‘divorce’, the rights of EU citizens in the UK and 
the nature of the border on the island of Ireland) before the exact nature of the 
UK’s trading position with the EU is established. One issue potentially with this 
strategy is that the nature of the border on the island of Ireland is inextricably 
linked to the nature of the trade relationship between the UK and the EU. 
Therefore, can both issues be successfully negotiated separately of one another? 
If, for example, the UK were to remain part of the Customs Union, then the 
border issue would, in large part, resolve itself. 
 
In a Special Article in the Commentary, Redmond, McGuinness and Kelly examine 
whether recent changes in the qualifying age for the Irish contributory state 
pension have had a causal effect on the overall retirement rate. Overall, the 
authors find no clear evidence that the change in the qualifying age had a causal 
effect on the overall retirement rate or the employment and unemployment 
rates of 65-year-olds in 2014. From a policy perspective the results are of interest 
as they provide some idea as to how responsive the labour market might be to 
measures aimed at increasing labour force participation. 
 
 
                                                          
 
15  Lawless, M. and Z. Studnika (2017). ‘Potential impacts of WTO tariffs on cross-border trade’, InterTradeIreland, 
available online at: www.intertradeireland.com. 

 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
  

 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 195.6 -4.8 4.0 186.3 -3.7 4.5 179.3 5.2 4.0 188.6 
Tourism 4.3 8.4 7.4 4.7 5.0 4.0 4.9 3.0 4.0 5.1 
Other Services 117.3 9.0 8.0 127.9 30.0 14.0 166.2 11.2 8.0 184.9 
Exports Of Goods and Services 317.2 0.5 3.4 318.8 9.9 3.9 350.4 8.0 4.7 378.5 
FISM Adjustment 9.4     16.2     18.2     19.8 
Adjusted Exports 326.6 2.6 4.6 335.0 10.0 4.5 368.7 8.0 4.9 398.3 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 4.4 17.5 13.3 5.2 45.3 42.8 7.6 19.2 21.0 9.0 
Other Building 7.8 31.1 23.3 10.3 25.4 20.0 12.9 26.6 20.0 16.3 
Transfer Costs 0.9 23.9 16.8 1.1 12.4 7 1.3 9.2 3.0 1.4 
Building and Construction 14.2 24.9 18.4 17.7 29.6 25.2 22.9 22.5 18.7 28.1 
Machinery and Equipment 39.0 79.4 76.7 70.0 16.2 13.3 81.3 14.0 10.2 92.8 
Total Investment 53.2 64.9 61.2 87.7 18.9 15.6 104.3 15.9 12.0 120.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc. 3.2 1.7 0.0 3.2 2.0 0.1 3.3 2.5 0.1 3.4 
Non-Agricultural Wages 76.1 5.4 4.2 80.3 6.5 5.2 85.5 5.5 4.7 90.2 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 21.2 26.3 5.6 26.8 47.8 12.8 39.6 24.7 9.8 49.4 
Total Income Received 100.6 9.7 9.7 110.3 16.4 18.1 128.4 11.3 14.1 143.0 
Current Transfers 23.9 3.0 0.8 24.7 0.5 0.1 24.8 -4.2 -1.0 23.8 
Gross Personal Income 124.5 8.4 5.5 135.0 13.5 18.2 153.2 8.8 13.5 166.7 
Direct Personal Taxes 28.2 4.1 1.2 29.4 3.5 0.6 30.4 2.5 0.8 31.2 
Personal Disposable Income 96.3 9.3 7.1 105.6 17.2 5.0 122.8 10.4 12.8 135.6 
Consumption 92.7 4.2 3.9 96.6 4.1 4.0 100.6 4.0 4.1 104.7 
Personal Savings 3.6 152.1 5.4 9.0 147.0 13.2 22.2 39.2 8.7 30.9 
Savings Ratio 3.7 
  
8.5   18.1   22.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.6 
  
21.7   19.8   19.4 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 % change in 2018 2018 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 86.9 1.5 8.2 88.2 0.1 -2.0 88.3 10.0 7.7 97.1 
Tourism 5.1 9.5 8.9 5.6 4.3 2.8 5.9 4.5 3.0 6.1 
Other Services 147.8 22.2 21.4 180.6 15.4 11.0 208.4 12.1 7.8 233.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 239.9 14.4 16.4 274.4 10.0 6.2 302.6 11.3 7.7 336.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.8   -0.9 
Adjusted Imports 239.9 14.4 16.4 274.4 10.0 6.2 301.8 11.3 7.7 336.0 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 317.2 318.8 350.4 378.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 239.9 274.4 302.6 336.9 
Net Factor Payments -52.1 -45.3 -50.4 -52.6 
Net Transfers -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 
Balance on Current Account 21.9 -4.2 -5.8 -14.2 
As a % of GNP 10.6 -1.9 -2.3 -5.3 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 109.9 112.8 109.5 109.5 
Industry 373.7 393.8 417.1 433.0 
Of which: Construction 125.5 135.9 148.8 161.5 
Services 1,474.1 1,506.6 1,557.6 1,591.5 
Total at Work 1,963.5 2,020.0 2,086.8 2,134.0 
Unemployed 203.6 173.0 136.2 120.9 
Labour Force 2,167.2 2,193.0 2,222.9 2,254.9 
Unemployment Rate, % 9.4 7.9 6.1 5.4 
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DID INCREASING THE STATE PENSION AGE IN IRELAND AFFECT THE 
RETIREMENT RATE OF 65-YEAR-OLDS? 
 
Paul Redmond, Seamus McGuinness and Elish Kelly1 
ABSTRACT 
In January 2014, the qualifying age for the Irish contributory state pension 
increased from 65 to 66 years. Individuals born after 1 January 1949 could no 
longer qualify for the pension at age 65, while individuals born before this date 
could still qualify, provided they had the required social insurance contributions. 
In this paper, we examine whether this change in the qualifying age had a causal 
effect on the retirement rate of 65-year-olds in Ireland. To do this, we compare 
the retirement rates of two groups of 65-year-olds in 2014; one group was born 
just after the cut-off date, thereby making them ineligible for the state pension at 
age 65, while the other group was born just before the cut-off date, making them 
potentially eligible, subject to meeting the insurance contribution requirements. 
We do not find clear evidence that the change in the retirement age had a causal 
effect on the retirement rate or the employment and unemployment rates of 65-
year-olds in 2014.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 2014, the transition state pension in Ireland was payable at age 65 to 
individuals who retired from insurable employment and satisfied certain social 
insurance contribution conditions. The transition state pension was payable for 
only one year from age 65, after which the person was automatically transferred 
to the contributory state pension at the age of 66.2 In 2014, the transition state 
pension was abolished, thereby increasing the pension qualification age to 66 
years.3 The implementation of the policy in 2014 was based on a person’s date of 
birth, such that individuals born before January 1949 could still qualify at age 65, 
whereas those born on or after 1 January 1949 had to wait until age 66. As a 
result, a 65-year-old in 2014 who was born in December 1948 and had the 
required social insurance contributions could receive the state pension, while a 
 
                                                          
 
1  The work carried out in this article was funded by the Department of Social Protection and we would like to thank all 
individuals in the Department who provided assistance during the project. We would also like to thank the Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) for providing us with access to the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) with the 
additional month of birth information required to conduct this study. Finally, we are grateful to Alan Barrett and an 
anonymous referee for providing valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
2  There also exists a non-contributory state pension in Ireland which is a means-tested payment to individuals who are 
aged 66 and over and do not qualify for the contributory state pension. 
3  These changes were outlined by the Irish government in March 2010, thereby giving individuals affected by the policy 
change almost four years advance notice of the pension age change. 
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65-year-old individual born in January 1949 (one month younger) with the same 
contributions had to wait until age 66 to receive the state pension.  
 
We exploit this sharp cut-off in the pension qualification age to analyse whether 
the policy change had a causal effect on the retirement rate of 65-year-olds in 
2014 using a regression discontinuity design. This is undertaken using data from 
the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS), Ireland’s labour force survey, 
which is conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The identification 
strategy can be explained in a straightforward way. Consider a scenario where we 
have data in 2014 on two groups of individuals; one group was born on 31 
December 1948 and the other on 1 January 1949. Both groups are 65, with one 
group being only one day older. However, the older group qualifies for the 
pension at 65 while the younger group does not. Comparing the retirement 
outcomes of both groups allows us to assess whether the policy change had a 
causal effect on the retirement rate. In addition to being virtually the same age, 
there is no reason to suspect that these two groups will be systematically 
different with respect to other characteristics (both observable and 
unobservable) that might impact on the retirement decision. Therefore, any 
difference in retirement outcomes can be attributed to a causal effect of the 
policy.  
 
While the policy change lends itself to a regression discontinuity analysis, it is 
important to point out some data limitations which impact the study. The finest 
level of information available to us on an individual’s birth date was their month 
of birth. As such, individuals are grouped into discrete monthly bins and 
identification relies on comparing the outcomes of those born in the month prior 
to the cut-off date, i.e., just qualified (based on age), to those born in the month 
after the cut-off date, i.e., barely missed out. As we are focusing on a narrow 
subset of the population, there is a relatively small number of observations. For 
example taking a three-month period on either side of the cut-off provides us 
with 431 observations; 238 individuals who just missed out on qualifying, i.e., 
were born between January and March 1949, and 193 individuals who just barely 
qualified, i.e., were born between October and December 1948.4 Small sample 
sizes are common in RD studies due to the narrow focus on a subset of the 
population. Expanding the analysis to include individuals further away from the 
threshold increases the sample size. However, given that identification relies on 
comparing people to the immediate left and right of the cut-off, the estimates 
should not be overly reliant on these observations. In this paper, we address this 
issue by verifying the robustness of our results to a restrictive specification which 
focuses on a very narrow bin width on either side of the month of birth cut-off.  
 
                                                          
 
4  These are the unweighted sample sizes. There is a weighting factor in the data which is designed to ensure it is 
representative of the population. We verify the results do not change when we estimate discontinuities using the 
weighting factors.  
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An additional consideration relates to the ‘bite’ of the policy among the sample of 
individuals studied, i.e., the number of 65-year-olds in 2014 that were actually 
affected by the policy change. Given the transition state pension was based on 
satisfying certain social insurance contributions, not everybody in the sample will 
be affected by the policy change. Conditioning only on 65-year-olds who were 
entitled to the state pension would require a larger and more detailed dataset 
that would allow us to identify people with the required insurance contributions 
and to ensure there was a large enough sample of these individuals for 
meaningful estimates. Ideally, this would be a linked administrative dataset 
between Revenue and the Department of Social Protection, which, in addition to 
providing details on the types of benefits received, would show an individual’s 
employment history. Should the data be made available, future research could 
examine the causal effect of the pension age change on the retirement decision, 
conditioning on individuals who had the required social insurance contributions.5 
However, in this study, we examine the retirement rates of all 65-year-olds in 
2014. Therefore our analysis provides evidence of the causal effect of the policy 
change on the overall retirement rate of 65-year-olds. In light of the data issues 
highlighted above, an additional contribution of this paper is to highlight 
potential avenues for further work and to make suggestions as to the type of data 
that would facilitate research which would be useful to inform the policy debate 
in this area.  
 
While the data do not allow us to identify a person’s eligibility based on their 
social insurance contributions, we make use of the QNHS question which 
captures information on whether a person has ever been in employment.6 If a 
person has never been employed then they will not have the required 
contributions to qualify for the transition state pension. Therefore, in addition to 
reporting estimates of the causal effect of the policy change on the overall 
retirement rate of 65-year-olds, we also report results where we condition only 
on individuals who have some previous employment experience. While this does 
not fully address the data issues outlined above, it goes some way towards 
narrowing the analysis to individuals who are likely to qualify for the transition 
state pension by focusing only on those who have some social insurance 
contributions. However, only 7 per cent of all 65-year-olds in our analysis report 
having no previous employment experience and excluding these individuals from 
the analysis has very little impact on the estimates and does not change the 
overall results of the paper.  
 
                                                          
 
5  Such information (social insurance contributions) is not collected by the QNHS data, which are the data used to 
conduct this analysis. 
6  There is also information on when an individual started work for their current employer. However, we cannot use 
this as it does not give information on their full employment history. 
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Relatively few studies examine how changes in retirement age rates affect 
retirement decisions. The research which does address this question utilises large 
administrative datasets (Staubli and Zweimuller, 2013; de Grip et al., 2013; Puur 
et al., 2015; Sanchez-Martin et al., 2014; Vestad, 2013). Staubli and Zweimuller 
(2013) examine the labour market effects of increasing the early retirement age 
in Austria and find that raising the retirement age increased employment of 
affected men by 9.75 percentage points and affected women by 11 percentage 
points. They also find that a large number of affected individuals bridge the gap 
to retirement by drawing on unemployment benefits; specifically, there was a 
12.51 percentage point increase in registered unemployment among men and 
11.77 percentage points among women. Other work has shown that increasing 
the pension age increases the actual retirement age (Puur et al., 2015) as well as 
the expected retirement age of employees (de Grip et al., 2013) and can lead to 
increases in labour supply (Vestad, 2013; Sanchez-Martin et al., 2014) and lower 
pension costs (Sanchez-Martin et al., 2014).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the data and 
present some descriptive statistics relating to the sample of 65-year-old 
individuals in 2014. The following section outlines the methodology and the 
Results section presents the main results as well as various robustness and 
sensitivity checks. The final section concludes and discusses some potential 
explanations for the lack of any clear evidence of a causal effect of the policy 
change on retirement rates.  
 
DATA 
We use data from the 2014 Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). Given 
that we are studying the effect of a change to the pension qualification age, and 
that identification in the RD design relies on people close to the qualification 
threshold, we focus our analysis on an older segment of the population. 
Individuals who were not close to 65 years at the time the policy was 
implemented will not be affected by the policy change, and therefore these 
individuals should not influence our estimates.  
 
There is a trade-off when it comes to choosing the sample of individuals to 
include in an RD study. Focusing on observations that lie very close to the 
assignment threshold is beneficial as it is these types of individuals upon which 
identification hinges, however this can often lead to a very small sample size. 
Expanding the analysis to include individuals further from the threshold can 
increase the sample size, however, the results should not be overly reliant on 
these individuals. The age threshold in this study is whether a person was born 
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before or after 1 January 1949. An alternative way of defining the threshold is a 
person’s age (in months) at the time the policy was implemented. People who 
were at least 780 months old at January 2014 were born before 1 January 1949 
and qualify, while those aged 779 months or younger were born after. In this 
paper we take two approaches. We begin our analysis with a broad age range by 
including individuals aged between 681 months (56.75 years) and 879 months 
(73.25 years) at the time the policy was implemented (on 1 January 2014). This 
gives us a relatively large sample size of 14,911 individuals. We then verify 
whether the results from our baseline specification are robust to an alternative 
age-restricted specification, which focuses only on individuals who were aged 65 
in 2014, i.e., people who were aged between 768 and 791 months at the time the 
policy was introduced. This reduces our sample size from 14,911 to 1,829; there 
were 940 individuals aged 65 in 2014 whose date of birth meant they missed out 
by between one and 12 months on qualifying for the pension at age 65. There 
were 889 individuals aged 65 in the older 12 month age range who could, based 
on their age, qualify for the pension at age 65.  
 
Our dependent variable is the probability of being in retirement and is based on 
an individual’s self-reported main labour status. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
65-year-olds in 2014 by main labour status. Almost 40 per cent of 65-year-olds 
were retired from employment in 2014, making this the largest category. A large 
number were also working for payment or profit (27 per cent) and engaged in 
home duties (21 per cent). Approximately 10 per cent report being unable to 
work due to permanent sickness or disability while almost 4 per cent are 
unemployed, having lost or given up their previous job. 
 
Table 2 splits 65-year-olds in 2014 into two groups; those whose date of birth 
meant they could not qualify for the state pension at age 65 (born after 1 January 
1949) and those whose date of birth meant they could still potentially qualify for 
the pension (born before 1 January 1949). Descriptive statistics are presented for 
both groups as well as statistics on their main labour status. The retirement rate 
of the group born before 1 January 1949 is 43 per cent compared to 36 per cent 
for the group born after 1 January 1949. However the difference between the 
two rates cannot be taken as a causal effect of the change in qualification age on 
retirement rates. The group born before 1 January 1949 are, on average, eight 
months older than the group born after 1 January 1949 and, as such, we would 
expect their retirement rates to be higher. This serves to motivate the benefits of 
using the regression discontinuity design, which overcomes this issue by 
comparing the average retirement rates of individuals just to the left and right of 
the qualification threshold who are closer in age.  
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TABLE 1  MAIN LABOUR STATUS OF 65-YEAR-OLDS IN 2014 
Main Labour Status  Frequency Per Cent 
Working for payment or profit 538 26.58 
Looking for first regular job *       * 
Unemployed, having lost or given up previous job 75 3.71 
Actively looking for work after voluntary interruption of 
working life for personal or domestic reasons * * 
Student or pupil * * 
Engaged in home duties 433 21.39 
Retired from employment 786 38.83 
Unable to work due to permanent sickness or disability 180 8.89 
Other * * 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note:  Estimates for numbers of persons or averages where there are less than 30 persons in a cell are not produced as estimates are 
 too small to be considered reliable.  
 
TABLE 2 AVERAGE CHARACTERISTICS OF 65-YEAR-OLDS IN 2014 
 Born before 1 Jan 1949 Born after 1 Jan 1949 
Gender (% male) 51.6% 49.4% 
Highest educational attainment (ISCED 11) 2.61 2.73 
Married  70.3% 73.9% 
Widowed 9.3% 7.3% 
Age at 1 Jan 2014 (months) 784 776 
   
Main Labour Status   
Working for payment or profit 25.1% 26.5% 
Looking for first regular job  * 
Unemployed, having lost or given up previous 
job * * 
Actively looking for work after voluntary 
interruption of working life for personal or 
domestic reasons 
 * 
Student or pupil * * 
Engaged in home duties 21.4% 22.1% 
Retired from employment 43.0% 35.6% 
Unable to work due to permanent sickness or 
disability 7.7% 10.3% 
Other * * 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note:  Estimates for numbers of persons or averages where there are less than 30 persons in a cell are not produced as estimates are 
 too small to be considered reliable. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Regression discontinuity is a quasi-experimental research design that allows for 
the causal analysis of a treatment, when assignment to that treatment changes 
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discontinuously at a pre-defined threshold.7 Regression discontinuity analysis can 
be implemented either parametrically or non-parametrically (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010). The parametric approach involves fitting a conditional mean function to 
the data on either side of the cut-off that determines treatment, using 
polynomials of various orders. The non-parametric approach is based on 
estimating a regression function in a neighbourhood of the cut-off, using a 
specified bandwidth and kernel. With a large number of observations and 
continuous data, the non-parametric estimator is desirable as it focuses the 
analysis on observations close to the cut-off (Skovron and Titiunik 2015; Gelman 
and Imbens 2014). However with discrete data that are reported in coarse 
intervals, such as the month of birth data used in this study, non-parametric 
methods may be of limited use. As noted by Lee and Card (2008), with coarse 
data an irreducible gap exists between the treatment group just above the cut-off 
and the control group just below, and as such it may not be possible to estimate a 
causal effect in the absence of a parametric assumption.  
 
The treatment under investigation in this study is whether or not an individual 
could qualify, provided they had the required social insurance contributions, for 
the transition state pension in Ireland at age 65. The variable which determines 
treatment assignment is known as the forcing variable, which in this case is date 
of birth. We were unable to source day of birth data, however we have data on 
month of birth. We can set up the forcing variable as an individual’s age, in 
months, at January 2014 (the implementation date of the policy). Those born in 
December 1948 are 780 months old in January 2014 and those born in January 
1949 are 779 months. Therefore, Ti is defined as a treatment dummy which 
indicates whether an individual can qualify, based on their month of birth, for the 
pension at age 65 in 2014, such that, 
𝑇𝑇 = �1 if age of individual i at Jan 2014 ≥ 780 months  0 if age of individual i at Jan 2014 < 780 months  
 
As such, the treated group are those individuals who can potentially qualify for 
the state pension at age 65, while the untreated are those who do not qualify. 
Any discontinuity in outcomes that exist as a result of the treatment should be 
evident at the 780 month threshold, i.e. a sharp jump in the probability of 
retirement for the 780 month group compared to the 779 month group. We 
focus our analysis on data from Quarters 2 and 3 of 2014. This ensures that the 
780 month and 779 month groups, upon which identification hinges, are both 
aged 65 at the time of survey. If we were to include data for Quarter 4, 2014, 
then it could be the case that some of the 780 month group would be 66 at the 
time of survey, whereas all of the 779 month group would be 65. Likewise, 
 
                                                          
 
7  For a detailed exposition of the regression discontinuity estimator and its properties, see Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
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including Quarter 1 data from 2014 would mean that some of the 779 group 
would still be 64 at the time of survey.8 
 
We employ a parametric regression discontinuity specification, which involves 
running separate regressions on both sides of the threshold of the outcome of 
interest on the forcing variable. We estimate the following regressions for those 
to the left of the 780 month threshold, i.e. the individuals who do not qualify for 
the state pension until age 66, and those to the right of the threshold, i.e. the 
individuals who could qualify, based on their month of birth, for the pension at 
age 65 (the treated), 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑖 = 𝛼𝐿 + 𝛽.𝑓𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴14𝑖 − 780) + 𝜀𝑖                              (1) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑅 + 𝛽.𝑓𝑅(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴14𝑖 − 780) + 𝜀𝑖                              (2) 
 
where fL and fR are polynomials in the forcing variable. The inclusion of the 
polynomial terms underlies the importance of getting the specification correct in 
order to avoid mistaking a non-linearity in the conditional expectation function 
for a discontinuity. The threshold value of 780 is subtracted from the forcing 
variable for convenience; the estimated discontinuity is then simply the 
difference between the intercepts, 𝛼𝑅 − 𝛼𝐿. Instead of estimating two separate 
regressions, it is straightforward to estimate a single pooled regression which 
gives identical results and has the advantage of yielding a direct estimate of the 
discontinuity and standard errors. The pooled regression is 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽.𝑇𝑖 + 𝜌.𝑓(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 780) + 𝛾.𝑇𝑖.𝑓(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 780) + 𝜀𝑖      (3) 
 
where Ti is the treatment dummy defined above and 𝛽 is an estimate of the 
causal effect of the pension age change on the probability of retirement. An 
interaction term between the treatment dummy and the polynomial is also 
included.  
 
RESULTS 
As a first step, before running the regression model (Equation 3), we calculate 
average outcomes for each of the discrete age points in the forcing variable. This 
is shown in Figure 1 for individuals aged between 681 months (56.75 years) and 
879 months (73.25 years) at the time the policy was implemented (on 1 January 
2014). The average retirement probability by age (in months) at January 2014 is 
calculated based on the main labour status of respondents (see Table 1). A 
dummy variable is created which equals one if the main labour status of 
 
                                                          
 
8  We verify that the results are robust to including all four quarters of data. 
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respondents is ‘retired from employment’ and zero otherwise.9 Averages of this 
dummy variable are calculated for each age category and are plotted in Figure 1. 
A vertical line is inserted in the graph to show the month-of-birth threshold. The 
average retirement probabilities are increasing with age, which explains the 
upward sloping averages. However, from this graph it is not immediately 
apparent whether a discontinuity exists at the threshold. Close inspection reveals 
that the groups who just barely missed out on treatment, upon which 
identification relies heavily, have similar retirement probabilities to those who 
just qualified. This becomes clearer when we look at Table 3 which lists the 
retirement probabilities for individuals depending on their age (in months) at 
January 2014. The retirement probability for the 778 group is roughly the same as 
the 780 group, and is higher than the 781-784 groups. Moreover, if we were to 
expand our bin widths to include two months of data, then the difference in 
retirement probabilities between those who barely qualified (the 780 and 781 
group) would barely differ from those who just missed out (the 778 and 779 
group). As such, there is no clear evidence that the change in the retirement age 
had a causal effect on the retirement rate.  
 
FIGURE 1  AVERAGE RETIREMENT PROBABILITIES 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9  We verify the results are robust to an alternative setup whereby the zeros in our retirement dummy are just those 
who are either employed or unemployed. This reduces our sample size and produces noisier estimates, however the 
main results remain unchanged.  
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TABLE 3 AVERAGE RETIREMENT PROBABILITIES BY AGE AT JANUARY 2014 
Age at Jan 2014 Month and Year of Birth Mean Obs 
771 Sept 1949 0.36 72 
772 Aug 1949 0.37 73 
773 July 1949 0.29 89 
774 June 1949 0.22 77 
775 May 1949 0.22 90 
776 April 1949 0.31 80 
777 March 1949  0.30 81 
778 Feb 1949 0.46 70 
779 Jan 1949 0.39 87 
780 Dec 1948 0.47 57 
781 Nov 1948 0.44 68 
782 Oct 1948 0.41 68 
783 Sept 1948 0.42 74 
784 Aug 1948 0.38 89 
785 July 1948 0.54 78 
786 June 1948 0.46 89 
787 May 1948 0.48 89 
788 April 1948 0.57 82 
789 March 1948 0.60 62 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
We employ a parametric specification (Equation 3) using polynomials of different 
orders, beginning with a linear specification, i.e., a first order polynomial. The 
conditional expectation function and the local averages are shown in Figure 2. 
The estimate of the discontinuity from this linear specification is quite large and 
statistically significant and taken in isolation this would indicate that the 
individuals who barely missed out on the treatment (those just below the 
threshold) are 17.5 percentage points less likely to be in retirement in 2014 than 
those who just barely qualified for treatment. However, in parametric regression 
discontinuity specifications, a linear model is often not the most suitable 
specification and in order to be confident in the estimates, they should be robust 
to more flexible, higher order polynomial specifications. There is no fixed rule for 
choosing which order of polynomial is most suitable and often the local averages 
provide a guide as to which conditional mean function appears to be the best fit 
to the data. However, Lee and Card (2008) provide some guidance to evaluate 
whether a low order polynomial, such as the first order specification in Figure 2, 
may be too restrictive, thereby calling into question the reliability of such results. 
They suggest using a goodness of fit statistic; 
)/(
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where ESSR is the error sum of squares from the polynomial (restricted) model 
and ESSUR is the error sum of squares from an unrestricted model which regresses 
the outcome variable on a full set of dummy variables for each of the discrete 
forcing variable bins. J denotes the number of bins, N the number of observations 
and K the number of parameters estimated in the restricted model. The statistic 
is distributed as F(J-K, N-J). If the statistic exceeds the critical value, this implies 
that our low order polynomial may be too restrictive.  
 
The goodness of fit statistic indicates that the linear specification used in Figure 2 
is restrictive.10 As such, the linear specification may be mistaking a non-linearity 
for a discontinuity. In Table A1 we present results using different polynomial 
specifications, ranging from a linear specification to a sixth order polynomial. The 
estimated discontinuity decreases quite quickly as we use more flexible 
functional forms, eventually disappearing in the fifth order specification. This 
relates to our previous discussion of Table 3, which shows that the retirement 
rates of individuals in the two bins just to the left of the threshold are very 
similar, or even larger, than those in the five bins just to the right of the 
threshold. This influences the conditional expectation function in the more 
flexible parametric functional forms, which can be seen in Figure 3, which plots 
the conditional expectation function of the fifth order polynomial. In this graph, 
no discontinuity exists at the threshold.11  
 
 
                                                          
 
10  The test statistic is 1.8 and the critical value is 1.17. 
11  The fifth order polynomial is clearly a more flexible specification, yet the goodness of fit test statistic (1.6) is still 
above the critical value (1.18). As mentioned, the Lee and Card (2008) test is not a precise test as to which order 
polynomial to use, but rather should be applied when a significant result is detected to give reassurance of the 
model’s suitability. The fact that the discontinuity disappears at the more flexible fifth order polynomial, which is still 
restrictive as per the Lee and Card (2008) test is conclusive. We can keep moving to more flexible, higher order 
polynomials, which would produce lower test statistics, but the results are still not statistically significant.  
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FIGURE 2 FIRST ORDER POLYNOMIAL SPECIFICATION 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
FIGURE 3 FIFTH ORDER POLYNOMIAL SPECIFICATION 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
As mentioned, the data are not ideally suited to non-parametric estimates due to 
the coarsely distributed forcing variable. Nonetheless, as an additional robustness 
check we also report estimates using a non-parametric local linear regression, as 
in Calonico et al. (2014). While the method used is local linear regression, our 
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data are in monthly bins to the left and right of the threshold, and therefore even 
this non-parametric method relies on observations away from the cut-off, 
although these are given a lower weight.12 The results of the non-parametric 
method indicate that there is no statistically significant effect of the policy change 
on retirement rates (see the last column of Table A1). 
 
In the last row of Table A1, we report results of a model which conditions only on 
individuals with some previous employment experience. The coefficients remain 
relatively consistent with the baseline model, both in terms of their magnitude 
and statistical significance. As with the baseline model, the estimates are not 
statistically significant for higher order polynomials and the non-parametric 
specification.  
Age-restricted specification 
Identification in the RD design relies on comparing individuals close to the 
threshold. This is particularly relevant in our study, as individuals far from the 
threshold may not be affected by the policy change. For example, the pension 
age changing from 65 to 66 may have less of an impact on the retirement 
decision of a 60-year-old compared to a 65-year-old.13 Likewise, a person who is 
already 66 years old (792 months) at January 2014 will not be affected by the 
policy change. There is an additional consideration with our data which relates to 
the age at which a person’s outcome is observed. We use outcome data from 
Quarters 2 and 3 of 2014, which ensures that all individuals in a three-month bin 
to the left of the cut-off are 65 years of age. However, beyond this, there are 
some individuals who are 64 when surveyed.14 This is shown in Table 4, which 
shows the average age (in years) at the time of survey (reference month) for each 
of the forcing variable months. For example, this indicates that all of the 
individuals who were 777 months old at January 2014 were 65 years old at the 
reference month, whereas the average age of individuals in the 776 group was 
64.91 years, meaning some were still 64 years old when their labour status was 
recorded.  
 
 
                                                          
 
12  The local linear regression uses a triangular kernel and an optimal sized bandwidth as per Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). 
13  It may affect their decision to retire as it will impact the amount of time they have to wait upon retirement before 
receiving the state pension. 
14  For example, a person who was 774 months old at January 2014 and who was surveyed in April 2014 will still be 64 at 
the time of survey.  
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TABLE 4 AVERAGE AGE DURING REFERENCE MONTH 
Age (in months) at Jan 2014 Average Age (in years) at Reference Month N 
771 64.08 72 
772 64.30 73 
773 64.43 89 
774 64.61 77 
775 64.74 90 
776 64.91 80 
777 65.00 81 
778 65.00 70 
779 65.00 87 
780 65.00 57 
781 65.00 68 
782 65.00 68 
783 65.07 74 
784 65.29 89 
785 65.44 78 
786 65.57 89 
787 65.75 89 
788 65.94 82 
789 66.00 62 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
While the inclusion of a large number of bins either side of the threshold is useful 
for analysing the continuity of the conditional mean function and increasing the 
sample size, the main results should not be overly reliant on these observations. 
We examine whether our main results are consistent with an alternative 
specification in which we use all available data from 2014 and condition on 
individuals who are 65 when their labour status is recorded. This automatically 
discards individuals whose age is +/- 12 months of the 780 month threshold at 
January 2014, reducing the total sample size from 14,911 to 1,829. However, 
while our sample size is smaller, we are limiting our analysis to 65-year-olds and 
therefore we can be confident that our analysis is focusing on individuals whose 
age implies that they were potentially affected by the policy change. Table 5 
shows the average retirement probabilities in 2014 of all individuals who were 
aged 65 in that year and Figure 4 displays the results graphically. Visual inspection 
of the average retirement probabilities suffices in this instance as we are 
including only 12 bins on either side of the cut-off, meaning parametric RD 
estimates of the conditional mean function provide little additional useful 
information. The slightly older 65-year-olds to the right of the threshold were 
potentially entitled to the state pension at age 65, whereas the slightly younger 
65-year-olds to the left of the threshold were not. Again, this analysis does not 
provide convincing evidence of a causal effect of the policy change on the 
retirement rate of 65-year-olds in 2014. The average retirement rate of 65-year-
olds who missed out on qualifying by at most two months was 41.6 per cent, 
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compared to 45 per cent for the slightly older 65-year-olds who just barely 
qualified by at most two months. As before, the retirement rates of the 778 
group, who just missed out, were equal to or higher than the rates for the 780-
784 groups, which again suggests the absence of a policy effect. 
 
TABLE 5 AVERAGE RETIREMENT PROBABILITIES OF 65-YEAR-OLDS IN 2014 
Age (in months) at Jan 2014 Pr(Retired) N 
771 [0.45] 40 
772 0.39 64 
773 0.32 79 
774 0.28 90 
775 0.31 108 
776 0.34 110 
777 0.30 115 
778 0.45 126 
779 0.39 160 
780 0.45 111 
781 0.45 121 
782 0.43 113 
783 0.40 106 
784 0.36 104 
785 0.48 86 
786 0.41 78 
787 0.39 67 
788 [0.48] 46 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Notes: Estimates for numbers of persons or averages where there are less than 30 persons in a cell are not produced as estimates are 
 too small to be considered reliable. Parentheses [ ] indicate where there are 30-50 persons in a cell. Such estimates are 
 considered to have a wider margin of error and should be treated with caution. 
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FIGURE 4 AVERAGE RETIREMENT PROBABILITIES OF 65-YEAR-OLDS IN 2014 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Robustness, validity and sensitivity analysis 
Identification in the regression discontinuity design is based on the assumption 
that individuals just to the left of the threshold possess similar observable and 
unobservable characteristics to those just to the right of the threshold, with the 
only difference between the two groups being that one barely qualified for 
treatment and one just missed out. While we cannot test whether the two groups 
are similar in their unobservable characteristics, we can test for comparability in 
observed characteristics. As mentioned above, of particular importance in this 
study is the age of the individual (in months) at the time of survey in 2014. 
Retirement is a function of age and if a systematic difference existed between the 
780 group and the 779 group in terms of their age (in months) at the time of 
survey, then this could bias the results. To see this, consider an example. The data 
captures outcomes of individuals surveyed in Quarters 2 and 3 of 2014. If the 779 
group were all surveyed in September 2014 and the 780 group were all surveyed 
in April 2014, that would mean that the 779 group at the time of survey, when 
the retirement outcome is captured, would be six months older than the 780 
group. Therefore, this could bias our results, as our estimate would reflect the 
higher probability of retirement for the 779 group and the lower probability of 
the 780 group which is due to differences in age, as opposed to the causal effect 
of treatment. Table 6 confirms that this is not an issue with our data. There is no 
systematic difference between the ages of the two groups at the time of survey. 
 
We also carry out a sensitivity analysis to see if the results change when a 
person’s age (in months) at the time of survey is included as an additional 
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explanatory variable in Equation 3. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion 
of this variable, as shown in the second row of results in Appendix Table A1.  
 
TABLE 6 AGE AT TIME OF SURVEY (IN MONTHS) 
Age at Jan 2014 Average Age at Time of Survey Obs 
780 785.5088 57 
779 784.6207 87 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Additional covariates are examined to investigate whether differences exist 
between the 780 and 779 groups, including; gender, highest educational 
attainment, the probability of being married and the probability of being 
widowed. The average scores for both groups on each of these characteristics are 
shown in Table 7 and, as we can see, both groups are comparable. These 
covariates are then added into the parametric specification, along with age at 
time of survey, and the results are presented in the third row of Table A1. The 
estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the additional covariates, which 
indicates that the estimate is not being influenced by systematic differences in 
characteristics between the groups to the right and the left of the threshold.  
 
TABLE 7 COMPARISON OF CHARACTERISTICS 
 Mean 
Characteristic 779 group 780 group 
Highest educational attainment (ISCED 11) 2.7 2.2 
Probability of being male 0.49 0.53 
Probability of being married 0.72 0.74 
Probability of being widowed 0.11 0.09 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
The graphical plots of the local average retirement rates (Figures 1 and 4) do not 
provide clear evidence of a discontinuity at the treatment threshold (780 
months). Moreover, any significant discontinuity at the threshold for the low 
order polynomial specifications vanishes when we introduce a more flexible 
functional form, as in Figure 3. However, a notable feature that emerges from the 
graphs and the table of local averages (both Tables 1 and 3), is an apparent jump 
in the retirement probabilities at the 778 group. In both the baseline and age-
restricted models, moving from the 777 to the 778 group sees a 16 percentage 
point increase in the retirement rate, from 30 per cent to 46 per cent. While the 
relatively low sample sizes can generate noisy estimates, the increase in 
retirement rates at 778 appears large and is statistically significant.  
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It is common practice in RD designs to carry out placebo tests which test for 
discontinuities away from the treatment threshold. If significant discontinuities 
are found at placebo points without any theoretical justification, this calls into 
question the reliability of the results at the threshold. We carry out a placebo test 
by designating the 778 group as a false cut-off and testing for discontinuities. The 
apparent jump at the 778 group is also of interest as it raises questions as to 
whether there was treatment contamination for those who just missed out on 
qualifying for the pension at age 65, i.e., did some individuals from the 778 and 
779 group still manage to avail of the state pension at age 65? If so, the 
regression discontinuity design would be invalidated.15 The results for each of the 
polynomial specifications are shown in the fourth row of results in Table A1. The 
estimates of the discontinuities at this point are larger in magnitude and show 
greater statistical significance at higher order polynomials and are statistically 
significant in the non-parametric specification. Therefore, the results using the 
778 month cut-off are more consistent with a causal effect of the policy 
compared to the actual 780 month cut-off. While this is potentially attributable to 
noisy estimates as a result of relatively small sample sizes, given the estimator 
used in the analysis, the result also raises questions as to whether treatment spill-
over occurred for individuals just to the left of the threshold.  
 
Further investigation of this apparent jump in the retirement outcomes of the 
778 group suggests that it may relate to individuals’ labour outcomes changing 
from ‘engaged in home duties’ to ‘retired’. Compared to the 777 group, the 778 
group has approximately 15 per cent less people engaged in home duties and 15 
per cent more who are retired. The questions relating to potential treatment 
spill-over remain if people engaged in home duties had the required insurance 
contributions and were granted the transition state pension despite barely 
missing out on the age threshold. However, the sample sizes are small, especially 
when we condition on individual categories, such as people engaged in home 
duties, making it difficult to draw concrete conclusions. Again, further analysis of 
this issue would require a richer dataset, ideally linking Revenue data to the 
Department of Social Protection data.  
 
Employment  
We carry out the same type of descriptive analysis as in Figure 1, but instead of 
using retirement as the outcome variable, we use employment. A dummy 
variable is created which indicates whether a person is ‘working for payment or 
profit’ during the reference month. We calculate averages of this outcome for 
 
                                                          
 
15  While we have no direct evidence that this occurred, the possibility of treatment spill-over should always be 
considered in studies of this nature. 
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each age category and Figure 5 shows the average employment in each of the 
monthly forcing variable bins. There is no clear evidence of a discontinuity at the 
threshold. As with the retirement outcome, when we run the RD regression 
(Equation 3), the discontinuity in the employment outcome is not robust to a 
flexible functional form, nor is it statistically significant when estimated using 
local linear regression (see Appendix Table A2). 
 
FIGURE 5 AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Unemployment 
We carry out the same descriptive analysis using unemployment as our outcome 
variable. A dummy is created which indicates whether a person’s labour status is 
‘unemployed, having lost or given up previous job’. Figure 6 shows the average 
unemployment in each of the monthly forcing variable bins. Again, there is no 
clear evidence of a discontinuity. When we run the RD regression (Equation 3), 
the estimates are not statistically significant when flexible function forms are 
used in the parametric estimation, nor are they significant when estimated using 
local linear regressions (see Appendix Table A3). 
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FIGURE 6 AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In 2014, the qualification age for the transition state pension in Ireland increased 
from 65 years to 66 years. A sharp qualification threshold was implemented, such 
that individuals born before January 1949 could still qualify for the transition 
pension at age 65, whereas individuals born on or after January 1949 had to wait 
until age 66. By exploiting this sharp threshold using a regression discontinuity 
design, we were able to estimate, using data from the QNHS, the causal effect of 
the policy change on the retirement rate of 65-year-olds in 2014. Our analysis 
does not provide clear evidence of a causal effect of the policy on retirement 
rates. There are several potential explanations for this. To qualify for the 
transition state pension, an individual must have the required social insurance 
contributions. Not all 65-year-olds will meet this requirement and therefore the 
‘bite’ of the policy may be limited as not all 65-year-olds are impacted by the 
change. Therefore, this may limit the effect of the policy change on the overall 
retirement rates of 65-year-olds. For example, if only a small percentage of the 
65-year-olds in our sample were affected by the change, it is possible that the 
retirement rates of this subsample could be impacted and yet this would not 
show up as a strong impact on the overall retirement rate.  
 
In addition, people’s contracts may specify a retirement age of 65, or even where 
none is specified, there may be an expectation that people will retire at this age. 
As such, these individuals may still have to retire despite not qualifying for the 
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transition pension. Moreover, the age at which an individual’s occupational 
pension begins may remain at 65. Therefore, the one-year income gap created by 
not qualifying for the state pension may not be too severe for some individuals. It 
has also been the case that some 65-year-olds who did not qualify for the 
transition state pension were receiving Jobseeker’s Benefit as a temporary 
payment until they reached the age of 66. The Department of Social Protection 
were aware that this was a temporary stop-gap measure to bridge people’s 
retirement income with little expectation that these individuals would find work. 
In this scenario, whereby the transition state pension is unavailable, but 
Jobseeker’s Benefit becomes a type of de facto pension payment which takes the 
place of the transition state pension, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
retirement rates are unaffected. This relates to how the outcome variable, i.e. the 
retirement rate, is constructed. This is based on an individual’s self-reported main 
labour status, which could give rise to a number of complications when 
evaluating the causal effect of the policy change. For one, it is unclear how 
individuals who could not receive the state pension at age 65, due to being born 
after 1 January 1949, but received jobseeker’s benefit as a type of de facto 
pension are categorised. Some of these individuals may report themselves as 
being unemployed, but others may report themselves as being in retirement. 
More detailed data would allow further investigation of this issue.  
 
Finally, in studies of this nature, the possibility of treatment spill-over should be 
considered. The retirement rates of those who barely missed out on qualifying for 
the pension at age 65, namely the 778 and 779 group, are in line with the 
retirement rates of the people who qualified. If some individuals from these 
groups still managed to avail of the state pension at age 65, this could help 
explain the lack of any clear treatment effect. However, we have no direct 
evidence that this occurred and our data does not allow for further investigation 
of this issue. 
 
We conclude with suggestions surrounding future work and improved data 
availability. Our analysis has focused on the retirement rate of 65-year-olds in 
2014. An avenue for future research would be to condition the analysis on 
individuals who had the required social insurance contributions, thereby ensuring 
that the policy change affected all individuals being studied. This would overcome 
concerns surrounding the limited bite of the policy among the full sample of 65-
year-olds. However, this would require a larger, more detailed dataset, which 
would provide data on an individual’s employment and social insurance 
contribution history and ensure that enough observations existed to produce 
meaningful estimates. A linked administrative dataset between Revenue and the 
Department of Social Protection may be useful in this regard. In addition, while 
we use month of birth data in this analysis, day of birth data would be more 
desirable, especially in a dataset with larger sample sizes.   
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TABLE A1 THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN THE STATE PENSION AGE ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
RETIREMENT 
 Order of Polynomial  
VARIABLES 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th 6th  Local Linear Regression 
T 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.105*** 0.070* -0.0016 -0.0207 0.057 
 (0.0154) (0.0230) (0.0305) (0.038) (0.0456) (0.0536) (0.0379) 
        
Additional 
controls No No No No No No No 
Observations 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 3,217 
        
T 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.105*** 0.071* -0.00164 -0.0207 0.057 
 (0.0154) (0.0230) (0.0305) (0.038) (0.0456) (0.0536) (0.0379) 
        
Additional 
controls 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Age at 
Interview 
Observations 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 3,217 
        
T 0.181*** 0.168*** 0.096*** 0.067* -0.00852 -0.0051 0.057 
 (0.0159) (0.0238) (0.0313) (0.039) (0.0461) (0.0544) (0.0379) 
        
Additional 
controls All All All All All All All 
Observations 14,696 14,696 14,696 14,696 14,696 14,696 3,217 
Placebo Test        
        
T (778 
months) 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.111*** 0.0816** 0.0026 -0.0039 0.117*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0229) (0.0303) (0.0378) (0.0505) (0.0531) (0.0375) 
        
Additional 
controls No No No No No No No 
Observations 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 3,063 
Individuals with employment experience      
        
T 0.189*** 0.176*** 0.102*** 0.054 -0.023 -0.046 0.025 
 (0.0164) (0.0245) (0.0325) (0.040) (0.048) (0.057) (0.044) 
        
Additional 
controls No       
Observations 13,774 13,774 13,774 13,774 13,774 13,774 2,514 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: The first three rows of results show the estimates from the baseline model with and without covariates. The fourth row 
 estimates the placebo model and the fifth row conditions only on individuals with previous employment experience. 
 
92 |  Q uar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  A ut um n  20 1 7  
 
TABLE A2  THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN THE STATE PENSION AGE ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
 Order of Polynomial  
VARIABLES 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Local Linear Regression 
      
T -0.109*** -0.076*** -0.050 0.013 0.064 
 (0.0153) (0.0227) (0.038) (0.0387) (0.0418) 
      
Additional controls No No No No No 
Observations 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 2,208 
Individuals with employment experience    
      
T -0.119*** -0.088*** -0.065* -0.004 0.048 
 (0.0163) (0.0242) (0.0323) (0.0412) (0.044) 
      
Additional controls No No No No No 
Observations 13,774 13,774 13,774 13,774 2,021 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: The first row of results shows the estimates from the baseline model. The second row conditions only on individuals with 
 previous employment experience. 
 
TABLE A3 THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN THE STATE PENSION AGE ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
 Order of Polynomials  
VARIABLES 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Local Linear Regression 
      
T -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.009 -0.003 -0.018 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.0062) (0.0023) (0.0127) 
      
Additional controls No No No No No 
Observations 14,911 14,911 14,911 14,911 3,061 
Individuals with employment experience    
 
      
T -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.011* -0.004 -0.025* 
 (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0138) 
      
Additional controls      
Observations 13,774 13,774 13,774 13,774 2,942 
 
Source: CSO Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: The first row of results shows the estimates from the baseline model. The second row conditions only on individuals with 
 previous employment experience. 
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